Pace University

DigitalCommons@Pace
Pace Law Faculty Publications

School of Law

1993

Reflections on United States v. Helmsley: Should "Impossibility"
Be a Defense to Attempted Income Tax Evasion?
Ronald H. Jensen
Elisabeth Haub School of Law at Pace University

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/lawfaculty
Part of the Taxation-Federal Commons

Recommended Citation
Ronald H. Jensen, Reflections on United States v. Leona Helmsley: Should 'Impossibility' Be A Defense to
Attempted Income Tax Evasion?, 12 Va. Tax Rev. 335 (1993), http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/lawfaculty/
507/.

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Law at DigitalCommons@Pace. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Pace Law Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@Pace.
For more information, please contact dheller2@law.pace.edu.

VIRGINIA TAX REVIEW
VOLUME 12, NUMBER 3

WINTER 1993

REFLECTIONS ON UNITED STATES V. LEONA
HELMSLEY: SHOULD 'IMPOSSIBILITY' BE A DEFENSE
TO ATTEMPTED INCOME TAX EVASION?

Ronald H. Jensen*
I.

INTRODUCTION

On April 14, 1988, a federal grand jury indicted Leona Helmsley,
her husband Harry, and two former Helmsley executives on 47
counts of attempted income tax evasion, filing false tax returns,
extortion, mail fraud and conspiracy.l Among other things, the indictment alleged that the Helmsleys caused various Helmsley-controlled companies to pay for lavish improvements to Dunnellen
Hall, their personal residence in Connecticut. 2 The indictment
* Professor of Law, Pace University School of Law; A.B., Yale University; LL.B. Harvard
Law School. The author would like to express appreciation to his colleagues Professors Bennett L. Gershman and Lissa Griffin for their helpful suggestions and comments. Appreciation is also expressed to Stephen Talkowsky and Kevin Wade for their research support.
1 Ransdell Pierson, The Queen of Mean: The Unauthorized Biography of Leona Helmsley
384-85 (1989); Indictment in United States of America against Harry B. Helmsley, Leona M.
Helmsley, Joseph V. Licari and Frank J. Turco, No. 88 Crim. 0219 (JMW) (S.D.N.Y. filed
April 14, 1988) [hereinafter the Helmsley Indictment]. Prior to the trial, the trial court
found that Mr. Helmsley.was incompetent to stand trial because of ill·health and granted
his motion for a continuance sine die. United States v. Helmsley, 733 F.Supp. 600 (S.D.N.Y.
1989).
.. Helmsley Indictment, supra note 1, charged that Helmsley-controlled companies made
the following expenditures, among others, on Dunnellen Hall: more than $1,000,000 spent on
a brick, limestone, and marble enclosure of a swimming pool (this addition ultimately included a marble dance floor and a breakfast room) [para. 36]; $500,000 for the purchase of
jade art objects [para. 37]; more than $130,000 for an indoor/outdoor stereo system [para.
38]; more than $370,000 in gardening and landscaping costs [para. 39]; more than $1,000,000
for furniture, antiques, artwork and other items [para. 40]. The Helmsley Indictment also
charged that Mrs. Helmsley regularly caused Helmsley-controlled companies to pay for
items of a purely personal nature (e.g., clothing, toiletries, and gifts), including $45,000 for a
silver clock designed in the shape of The Helmsley Building as a birthday present for Harry
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charged the Helmsleys with attempting to evade their income
taxes by willfully failing to report the value of these improvements
as taxable income. 3 Under the tax evasion statute, it is the "attempt" to evade tax, not the act of evasion itself, that constitutes
the crime.'
During the six week trial that ensued, the government presented
voluminous evidence showing that the defendants prepared, or
caused to be prepared, "phony" invoices falsely showing work that
had actually been performed at Dunnellen Hall as having been
performed for various Helmsley-controlled companies.1\ The defendants then caused the billed companies to pay the invoices. 6
Upon completion of the government's case, the defense stunned
the prosecution and the court by asserting that, far from cheating
the government, the Helmsleys had in fact overpaid their income
taxes for the years in question by $696,000. 7 This was after conced-

Helmsley. Id., para. 44.
• Helmsley Indictment, supra note 1, para. 47-49 (counts 2-4).
• LR.C. § 7201 (prohibiting "attempts in any manner to evade or defeat" a tax); Spies v.
United States, 317 U.S. 492, 499 (1943) ("Although the attempt succeed in evading tax,
there is no criminal offense of that kind, and the prosecution can be only for the attempt.").
See discussion infra part lILA.
• Mr.. Olivieri, chief operating officer of Riverview Interiors, testified that Jpseph Licari, a
defendant and a Helmsley employee, directed him to prepare an invoice for the work his
company performed in enclosing a pool at Dunnellen Hall falsely showing the work as having been done at the Helmsley-owned Graybar Building. Richard Hammer, The Helmsleys:
The Rise of Harry & Leona 239-41 (Signet 1991). Jeremiah McCarthy, chief engineer of
Helmsley-Spear, Inc., testified that when he refused to sign an invoice' falsely describing
work done at Dunnellen Hall as having been performed for several Helmsley hotels, Mrs.
Helmsley bawled him out and told him, "You sign what you're told to sign." Id. at 243-44.
Jolin Struck, a Helmsley employee, testified that he falsified invoices for a swimming pool
and enclosure at Dunnellen Hall showing such work as having been performed for other
Helmsley-owned properties; Struck testified that he had been told by Licari and Frank J.
Turco (another defendant and a Helmsley employee) that the orders to falsify the invoices
came from the Helmsleys, and that he did not doubt this, since he helped prepare monthly
reports to the Helmsleys detailing the work done at Dunnellen Hall and had seen invoices
on which their initials appeared approving payment. Id. at 250-52. Steve Chang, who became a trouble-shooter on the Dunnellen Hall project in late 1984, testified that Mrs.
Helmsley had him solicit a proposal from Audio Sound to provide music to the indoor pool.
Audio Sound submitted a proposal falsely describing the music system as a security system
for 230 Park Avenue. He testified that Mrs. Helmsley looked at the proposal and wrote
"Okay. Leona Helmsley." Id. at 254-57.
• See, e.g, id. at 241, 257.
7 The accounting firm of Touche, Ross made a quick analysis of the property owned by
certain Helmsley real estate partnerships that showed that about 7.8 percent of the value of
the partnerships' property consisted of personal rather than real property. Since the part-
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ing arguendo that payments made for the work done at Dunnellen
Hal~ were taxable to the Helmsleys. The theory of the defense was
that real estate partnerships in which the Helmsleys held interests
had taken insufficient depreciation for the years in question. The
defense asserted that if the correct amount of depreciation had
been deducted by the partnerships, the Helmsleys' personal share
of the increased deductions 8 would more than offset the value of
the Dunnellen Hall improvements paid for by the Helmsley companies. 9 There was thus no underpayment of tax, but rather an
overpayment.
The issue of whether the Helmsleys had overpaid their taxes was
vigorously contested by the government and the defense. 1o Ultimately, the jury rejected the contentions of the defense and found
Leona guilty of 33 felonies, including conspiracy, attempted tax
evasion, filing false tax returns and mail fraud. l l
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed Leona's

nerships had classified all 9f their property as real property, and since personal property can
be written off for tax purpose at a faster rate than real property, Touche, Ross concluded
that the partnerships (and consequently the Helmsleys) had claimed less depreciation than
they were entitled to for the years in question. These findings were submitted to Gerald w.
Padwe, a Touche, Ross senior partner, who calculated that the Helmsleys had overpaid their
income taxes by $696,000 for the prosecution years (1983-1985). Id. at 291-92. Padwe subsequently reduced his estimate of the alleged tax overpayment to $602,000, and then to
$591,000. Id. at 297.
8 A partnership pays no federal income tax. Items of income flow through to the individual partners in proportion to their ownership interests. Likewise, partnership deductions
flow through to the partners and reduce their taxable income. See I.R.C. §§ 701-704 .
8 Hammer, supra note 5, at' 291-92.
10 Gerald W. Padwe, who testified as an expert witness for Mrs. Helmsley on the issue of
the alleged tax overpayment, was subjected to an intensive cross-examination by Assistant
United States Attorney James DeVita. DeVita asked Padwe if Mr. Helmsley had taken insufficient depreciation on the partnership properties between 1983 and 1985, did that not
mean he had taken too much depreciation in 1986, 1987 and 1988..Padwe answered that it
was possible. Id. at 296-97. DeVita pointed out that Padwe had reduced his original estimate of the alleged tax overpayment of $696,000 to $602,000 and then to $591,000 and
asked: "If we give you another week, maybe it will be gone altogether." Id. at 297. DeVita
pointed out that one Helmsley real estate partnership had reported a capital gain of $23
. million on the sale of a building at 225 Broadway in 1983, and that the partnership had
classified all of the property in the sale as real property. DeVita asked if 7.8 percent of the
property were personal property, which the Touche, Ross analysis showed was usually the
case, would that not mean that there was depreciation recapture of $364,353 on the sale, and
that Mr. Helmsley's share of that, or $218,612, would be taxable as ordinary income rather
than capital gains as Mr. Helmsley had reported. Padwe had no answer, since he had not
examined that transaction. Id. at 297-98.
11 Pierson, supra note 1, at 387-88.
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conviction for attempted income tax evasion in a split decision. 12
Chief Judge Oakes dissented on the ground that the government
had failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the Helmsleys
owed any additional tax. 13
Both the trial court and the circuit court agreed that a taxpayer
cannot be convicted of attempted income tax evasion if no additional tax is due, even if the taxpayer intended to defraud the government of tax and took substantial steps toward that end. 14 The
Helmsley case thus raises the profound issue of whether a person
who intentionally sets out to cheat the government of income tax
and takes substantial steps toward that objective should nevertheless be acquitted of attempted income tax evasion merely because
unrelated or unknown factors eliminate the tax deficiency and
thereby frustrate the attempt to defraud the government. This defense will be referred to in this article as the "No-Tax-Due"
defense.
The case law has answered this question in the affirmative. ili
,
.. United States v. Helmsley, 941 F.2d 71 (2d Cir. 1991), cert. den., 112 S.Ct. 1162 (1992).
IS Id. at 103-07. The court of appeals subsequently affirmed the trial court's denial of
Mrs. Helmsley's motion for 'a new trial. United States v. Helmsley, No. 92-1202 (2d. Cir.
Feb. 16, 1993).
14 The trial court charged the jury that:
In order for the crime of income tax evasion to be proved, the government must establish beyond a reasonable doubt each of the following elements: First, that the defendant and her husband owed substantially more federal income tax for the calendar
year than was declared due on their joint personal income tax return; second, that the'
defendant knew that she and her husband owed substantially more federal income
tax than was declared due on their income tax return; third, that the defendant filed
their joint tax return reflecting an income tax substantially lower than the full
amount of income tax with the intention of defrauding the government of taxes owed.
Trial transcript at 7725-26. In other words, a defendant who files his or her income tax
return with intent to defraud the government of income tax (the third element) may not be
convicted of attempted income tax evasion unless there is also an actual tax deficiency (the
first element).
The circuit court also agreed that to convict a defendant of attempted income tax evasion,
the government must prove the existence of a tax deficiency in addition to proving willfulness. Helmsley, 941 F.2d at 83-84.
.. Sansone v. United States, 380 U.S. 343, 351 (1965) (dictum); Lawn v. United States,
355 U.S. 339, 361 (1958) (dictum); United States v. Petti, 448 F.2d 1257, 1258 (3d Cir. 1971);
United States v. Wilkins, 385 F.2d 465, 468 (1967), cert. den., 390 U.S. 951 (1968); Koontz v.
United States, 277 F.2d 53, 55 (5th Cir. 1960); Small v. United States, 255 F.2d 604 (1st Cir.
1958).
In Helmsley, the government in its brief to the circuit court argued that the No-Tax-Due
defense should be restricted to cases where the unreported, offsetting deduction was related
to the income on which the defendant attempted to evade tax, and added that "lilt is,
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This result is surprising because little, if anything, in the language
of the statute l6 or its legislative history l7 supports the conclusion.
There is virtually no reasoned analysis in the cases supporting this
conclusion. 18 This dearth of reasoned judicial analysis is surprising
given the substantial learned commentary concerning the analogous impossibility defense in the law of attempt. 19 In the context
of income tax evasion, no court or commentator has noted this
connection between the No-Tax-Due defense and the impossibility
defense.
.
This Article analyzes the appropriateness of the No-Tax-Due defense, and the circumstances in which the No-Tax-Due defense
should prevail against a charge of attempted income tax evasion.
Part II poses, as a basis for analysis, a set of hypothetical cases in
which the defense is potentially available. Part III reviews the
background of this issue, including the statutory scheme of the
federal tax crimes, relevant legislative history and the judicial development of the No-Tax-Due defense. Part IV reviews the impossibility defense in the law of attempt and points out its similarity
to the No-Tax-Due defense. Part V proposes a revised, and greatly
curtailed, No-Tax-Due defense. The formulation of this revised defense draws heavily on the learning developed in the controversy
over the impossibility defense in the law of attempt. Finally, Part
VI discusses various issues that would be raised if the revised NoTax-Due defense were adopted..
II. VARIATIONS ON A THEME: THE No-TAX-DuE DEFENSE IN
DIFFERENT CONTEXTS
Defendants may employ the No-Tax-Due defense in a wide variety of settings. The following set of hypothetical cases demonstrates the diversity of circumstances in which the defense is potentially available and provides a basis for analysis:
moreover, open to question why an actual deficiency is even necessary for proof of an attempt to evade." Respondent's Brief at 50-51, 941 F.2d·71 (No. 90-1012). The circuit court
declined these invitations to restrict, or reject, the No-Tax-Due defense and instead based
its decision on the ground that there was sufficient evidence on which the jury could find
that an actual deficiency existed. Helmsley, 941 F.2d at 83-89.
1. See analysis of language of I.R.C. § 7201, infra notes 30-34 and accompanying text.
11 See discussion infra part III.B.
1. See discussion infra part III.C.
.. See discussion infra part IV.
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1. The Unreported Gift. D receives a $100,000 gift from an uncle

and believes it to be taxable income. Intending to. defraud the government, D omits the $100,000 from his income tax return. The
Internal Revenue Code ("Code") expressly provides that gifts are
nontaxable receipts. 20

2. The Fictitious Dependent. D, with intent to defraud the government, claims an exemption on his income tax return for a nonexistent child. In a separate item on his income tax return, D incorrectly treats an ordinary loss as a capital loss. If properly reported,
this loss would eliminate the income tax deficiency created by the
ficticious dependent. 21
3. The Hotel Baroness. D, owner of a group of luxury hotels,
charges personal expenses to her hotel corporations and does not
report the resulting personal benefit as taxable income. D's intent
is to defraud the government. On a separate item on her income
tax return, D claims depreciation deductions on her business property. An audit of the depreciation schedules reveals that because of
a mathematical error, she claimed less depreciation than she was
entitled to. Had the proper amount of depreciation been taken, the
increased deduction would have more than offset the income D
failed to report; indeed, D would be entitled to a tax refund. 22
4. Skimmed Funds. D, sole owner of a corporation, "skims" funds
from the corporation and does not report them as taxable income
although he believes the funds to be taxable. A subsequent audit of
the corporation reveals it did not have any "earnings and profits"
at the time of the skimming and therefore the amounts skimmed
I.R.C. §.102(a).
This hypothetical case is based upon the facts of Koontz v. United States, 277 F.2d 53
(5th Cir. 1960).
22 This hypothetical case is based on United States v. Helmsley, 941 F.2d 71 (2d Cir.
1991), cert. den., 112 S. Ct. 1162 (1992). The facts have been modified to provide that the
failure to take adequate depreciation was due to a "mathematical error." In Helmsley, the
majority found that the taxpayer's failure to segregate real and personal property (which
caused the reduced depreciation deductions) was in effect an adoption of a method of accounting that could not be changed without the approval of the Commissioner; thus, it rejected Mrs. Helmsley's claim that she had overpaid her taxes. Helmsley, 941 F.2d at 87.
However, this argument would not be available under the facts of the Hotel Baroness case,
since the applicable regulation states that "correction of mathematical or posting errors" is
not a change of an accounting method requiring the approval of the Commissioner. Treas.
Reg. § 1.446-l(e)(2)(ii)(b).
.
20

21
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by D were really nontaxable returns of capital. 28
5. The Unrecognized Picasso. D contributes a painting to the local
museum. D, intending to defraud the government of tax revenue,
claims a charitable contribution that vastly exceeds the value that
D believes the painting to have. In fact, it turns out that the painting is a Picasso painted during his "Blue Period" and has a value
far in excess of the amount claimed by D on his return. 24
•• Under I.R.C. § 301(c), a distribution from a corporation to a shareholder is taxable as
ordinary income only to the extent it is a "dividend." If the total distribution exceeds the
portion constituting a dividend, the excess amount is first applied to reduce the shareholder's basis in his stock, and any amount remaining after his basis has been reduced to
zero is treated as gain from the sale of the stock. I.R.C. § 316 defines a "dividend" as a
distribution by a corporation to a shareholder that is made out of either current or accumulated "earnings and profits." As a result of the foregoing rules, a distribution made by a
corporation that has no current or accumulated "earnings and profits" is not a "dividend,"
and is therefore not taxable as ordinary income. In the Skimmed Funds case posed in the
text, it is assumed that the corporation has no current or accumulated "earnings and profits" and that the amount of the funds skimmed by D (i.e., the distribution) does not exceed
D's basis in his stock so that no portion of the skimmed funds is taxable.
It is now relatively well established for civil tax purposes that funds diverted, or
"skimmed," by a shareholder from his corporation, if not in fraud of creditors or other
shareholders, are corporate distributions and thus are taxable, if at all, only pursuant to
I.R.C. §§ 301, 316. Truesdell v. Commissioner, 89 T.C. 1280 (1987), acq. 1988-2 C.B. 1;
DiZenzo v. Commissioner, 348 F.2d 122 (2d Cir. 1965); Simon v. Commissioner, 248 F.2d 869
(8th Cir. 1957). In Truesdell, the Tax Court overruled its earlier decision in Benes v. Commissioner, 42 T.C. 358 (1964), affd, 355 F.2d 929 (6th Cir. 1966), cert. den., 384 U.S. 961
(1966). In Benes, the Tax Court had held that although corporate diversions could not be
taxed as "dividends" pursuant to I.R.C. § 30l(c) and its statutory predecessors where the
corporation had no earnings and profits, such diversions could nonetheless be taxed under
the sweeping definition of "gross income" found in I.R.C. § 61 and its statutory predecessors, since the shareholder exercised complete control and dominion over the diverted funds.
This approach was specifically rejected in Truesdell and the Commissioner has acquiesced
to that portion of the decision. In Weir v. Commissioner, 283 F.2d 675, 684 (6th Cir. 1960), a
civil tax case, the Sixth Circuit followed the position enunciated by the Tax Court in Benes;
however, the continuing viability of Weir is doubtful in view of the Commissioner's acquiescence in Truesdell.
The criminal tax consequences of a shareholder's failure to report as taxable income funds
which he diverted from his corporation are more problematic. See infra note 28.
•• It is assumed in this example that a willing buyer or a willing seller of the painting
could have ascertained that the painting was a Picasso with the exercise of reasonable diligence. Thus, the fair market value at the time of the gift, and the amount for which D was
entitled to take a charitable deduction, would reflect the fact that it was a Picasso. Treas.
Reg. § 1.170A-1(c).
"If a charitable contribution is made in property other than money, the amount of
the contribution is the fair market value of the property at the time of the contribution . . . . The fair market value is the' price at which the property would change
hands between a willing buyer and a willing seller ... both having reasonable knowledge of relevant facts."
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6. The Ten-Percenter. W wins big at the racetrack. When collecting their prizes, big winners are required to fill out U.S. Treasury
Form 1099 setting forth their names and social security numbers. 26
A custom has developed at the tracks where certain persons called
"ten percenters" cash the winning tickets for the true winners and
fill out the form setting forth their names and social security numbers rather than those of the true winners in exchange for 10 percent of the winnings. The ten percenter does this to shield the true
winner from income tax liability on his winnings. Treasury Department agents observe D acting as a ten percenter for W. D is arrested for attempting to evade the income tax liability of W.26 W,
realizing that the Treasury Department knows of his winnings, dutifully reports the full amount of his winnings and does not therefore have any income tax deficiency.27
Despite the factual differences in these six hypothetical cases,
which might seemingly require different outcomes, under current
law, D would be acquitted in every hypothetical case under the
No-Tax-Due defense. 28 This Article endeavors to uncover the unId.; 5 Boris I. Bittker, Federal Taxation of Income, Estates and Gifts (1984) § 132.1.2. Bittker states that:
[t]he standard definition of fair market value presupposes that the buyer and seller
both have 'reasonable knowledge of relevant facts.' As a minimum, this evidently includes not only the facts that are publicly available, but also those that a reasonable
buyer or seller would elicit by inquiry or investigation before coming to an agreement
on the price.
Id at 132-8 to 132-9. If, however, the parties could not have reasonably ascertained that the
painting was a Picasso (for example, if the Picasso had been painted over by an inferior
artist), then the Commissioner theoretically could argue that D had fraudulently overvalued
the painting's fair market value at the time of the donation, since its fair market value at
that time would not reflect the fact that it was a Picasso.
•• I.R.C. § 6041.
•• Under the tax evasion statute, one may be convicted for attempting to evade another's
tax as well as one's own tax. See, e.g., United States v. Troy, 293 U.S. 58 (1934) (corporate
president indictable for evading corporation's income tax by filing false corporate return).
.. This hypothetical case is based on the facts of United States v. Petti, 448 F.2d 1257 (3d
Cir. 1971).
•• Koontz v. United States, 277 F.2d 53 (5th Cir. 1960), applied the No-Tax-Due defense
to facts similar to those of the Fictitious Dependent case (case 2). United States v. Petti,
448 F.2d 1257 (3d Cir. 1971), applied the No-Tax-Due defense to facts similar to those of
the Ten-Percenter case (case 6). In Helmsley, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
recognized, on facts similar to those of the Hotel Baroness case (case 3), that a defendant in
those circumstances could not be convicted of attempted income tax evasion unless there
was a tax deficiency. The Unreported Gift case (case 1) and the Unrecognized Picasso case
(case 5) would be governed by the general rule that a conviction for attempted income tax
evasion could only be sustained if there was a tax deficiency.
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derlying policy considerations involved in this issue and to determine the proper outcomes in the above cases. Preliminarily, however, the Article will review the statutory scheme of the federal tax
crimes, the legislative history of the income tax evasion statute and

The situation regarding the Skimmed Funds case (case 4) is muddled. All the appellate
decisions involving a charge of attempted income tax evasion against a person diverting, or
skimming, corporate funds have sustained a conviction, notwithstanding the absence of any
"earnings and profits." Nonetheless, the author believes that, on the facts of the Skimmed
Funds case, the defendant would be acquitted under the current state of the law.
In Davis v. United States, 226 F.2d 331 (6th Cir. 1955), cert. den., 350 U.S. 965 (1956), the
Sixth Circuit affirmed a conviction of a person diverting corporate funds on the theory that
such funds would be taxable by reason of the defendant's dominion and control over them
even if they were not taxable as corporate distributions due to the lack of any "earnings and
profits." Id. at 334-35. The court did not challenge the general rule that a conviction for
attempted income tax evasion required the presence of a tax deficiency; rather, it asserted
that there was a tax deficiency because the diversions would be taxable to the defendant
regardless of whether there were any "earnings and profits." Id. at 335. This view, which
was a tenable view of the civil tax law when the Davis case was decided in 1955, has now
been largely discredited by subsequent cases. See discussion supra note 23. If the Sixth
Circuit follows the civil tax rule as it has now evolved, it would presumably now acquit the
defendant in the Skimmed Funds case.
In United States v. Miller, 545 F.2d 1204 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. den., 430 U.S. 930 (1977),
the court affirmed a conviction for attempted income tax evasion notwithstanding the defendant's assertion that the corporation from which he diverted the funds had no "earnings
and profits," because it found that the diversion was in the nature of "salary" rather than a
distribution by a corporation to its shareholder. A salary paid to an employee is, of course,
fully taxable to the employee regardless of whether the corporate employer has any earnings
and profits. I.R.C. § 61(a)(1). The defendant in Miller was hampered in his assertion that
his diversions should be treated as corporate distributions to a shareholder because he was
not listed on the books of the corporation as a shareholder. Id. at 1215. Thus, the Miller
court would presumably find the presence or absence of "earnings and profits" relevant
where the person skimming the corporation's funds was its sole shareholder, as in the
Skimmed Funds case.
Nonetheless, dicta in the Miller case seemingly suggest that a defendant might be convicted of attempted income tax evasions even if there were no civil tax deficiency:
The difficulty in automatically applying the constructive distribution rules to his
case is that it completely ignores one essential element of the crime charged: the willful intent to evade taxes, and concentrates solely on the issue of the nature of the
funds diverted. The latter aspect is not the important element. Where the taxpayer
has sought to conceal income by filing a false return, he has violated the tax evasion
statutes.
Id. at 1214. This suggestion contradicts the general rule that the presence of a tax deficiency
is a sine qua non for a conviction of attempted income tax evasion. It has not been followed
by subsequent cases and has been criticized by the commentators. Harry G. Balter, Tax
Fraud and Evasion: A Guide to Civil and Criminal Practice Under Federal Law ~
11.04[2][d][ii] n.213 (4th ed. Supp. 1981) (case is "of doubtful validity"). See also Ira L.
Tilzer, May IRS Ignore Character of Diverted Funds in Criminal Cases?, 46 J. Tax'n 308
(1977).
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the judicial development of the No-Tax-Due defense.

III.
A.

BACKGROUND

The Statutory Scheme of Federal Tax Crimes

The Code sets forth a comprehensive schedule of tax crimes.
The most serious of these, "the capstone of [the] system,"29 and
the subject of this article, is the "tax evasion statute" found in section 7201. This section provides that, "[a]ny person who willfully
attempts in any manner to evade or defeat any tax imposed by this
title or the payment thereof shall, in addition to other penalties
provided by law, be guilty of a felony .... "30 This crime carries the
harshest penalties of all tax crimes: a maximum fine of $250,000 in
the case of an individual ($500,000 in the case of an organization)31
and a maximum prison sentence of five years. 32
The courts conventionally list the three elements necessary for a
violation of this section: an affirmative act of evasion or attempted
evasion, willfulness, and an additional tax due and owing. 33
The last of these three requirements is a judicial creation. The
statute nowhere requires that any tax over and above that shown
on the return be due and owing. Furthermore, the statute does not
require the perpetrator to actually succeed in his attempt to evade
or defeat the tax. Indeed, the completed act of tax evasion is not in
itself a crime; it is the attempt that is criminal. As the Supreme
Court observed:
This is an independent crime, complete in its most serious form
when the attempt is complete, and nothing is added to its criminality by success or consummation, as would be the case, say, of
attempted murder. Although the attempt succeed in evading tax,
there is no criminal offense of that kind, and the prosecution can
only be for the attempt. 34

Of course, a provision like section 7201, which is a part of a comprehensive statutory scheme, derives its meaning largely from its
•• Spies v. United States, 317 U.S. 492, 497 (1943).
30 I.R.C. § 7201.
31 18 U.S.C. § 3571 (1988).
so I.R.C. § 7201.
33 Sansone v. United States, 380 U.S. 343, 351 (1965).
34 Spies v. United States, 317 U.S. 492, 498-99 (1943).
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relationship to the other parts of that scheme. Therefore, a brief
review of the other serious tax crimes is set out below.
Filing a False and Fraudulent Return: Section 7206(1) makes it
a crime to "willfully make[] and subscribe[] any return ... which
[the maker] does not believe to be true and correct as to every
material matter."311 Like the evasion statute, violation of section
7206(1) is a felony.36 However, unlike section 7201, the maximum
prison sentence for violation of section 7206(1) is three years
rather than five. 37. The maximum fines are the same as in section
7201. 38 In contrast to the evasion statute, the government is not
required to prove in a section 7206(1) case that the taxpayer owes
any additional tax or even that the taxpayer intended to evade the
payment of his taxes. 39
Failure to File a Return or Pay a Tax: Section 7203 provides
that any person "who willfully fails to pay ... [a] tax [or] make a
return" is guilty of a misdemeanor. 4o The maximum fine is
$100,000 for an individual ($200,000 in the case of an organization),41 and the maximum prison sentence is one year. 42
Miscellaneous Crimes: In addition to the foregoing, the government may assert a number of other crimes in a tax case, some of
which are found in the Code while others are set forth in the general criminal statutes. These include aiding or assisting in the
preparation of a materially false tax document,43 impeding or obstructing the administration of the internal revenue laws,44 conspiracy,411 making false statements,46 perjury,47 and mail and wire

3. LR.C. § 7206(1).
3. Id.

Id.
38 18 U.S.C. § 3571(1988).
38 E.g., United States v. Taylor, 574 F.2d 232, 234 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. den., 439 U.S. 893
(1978).
'0 LR.C. § 7203.
.. A violation of § 7203 constitutes a Class A misdemeanor because the maximum term of
imprisonment authorized is one year. IRC. § 7203; 18 U.S.C. § 3559(a)(6) (1988). Therefore,
the maximum fine that may be imposed for its violation is $100,000 in the case of an individual, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3571(b)(5) (1988), and $200,000 in the case of an organization, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3571(c)(5) (1988).
.. LR.C. § 7203.
'3 IRC. § 7206(2) .
.. IRC. § 7212.
•• 18 U.S.C. § 371 (1988).
•• 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (1988).
37
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fraud. 48

B.

Legislative History of the Tax Evasion Statute

The present income tax evasion statute has evolved in four
stages. The first modern income tax act, the Income Tax Law of
1913, provided that one "who makes any false or fraudulent return
... with intent to defeat or evade the assessment required by this
section ... shall be guilty of a misdemeanor."49 The maximum fine
for the offense was set at $2000 and the maximum prison sentence
at one year. 60
The statute entered its second stage with the enactment of the
Revenue Act of 1917. 61 It provided that anyone "who makes any
false or fraudulent return, and whoever evades or attempts to
evade any tax imposed by this Act" would be guilty of a misdemeanor and subject to a maximum fine of $1000 and a maximum
prison sentence of one year. 62 Structurally, the 1917 Act divided
what had been described under the prior law as a single offense,
making a "false or fraudulent return ... with intent to defeat or
evade" the tax, into two separate and discrete offenses: the making
of a "false or. fraudulent return," and the evasion or attempted
evasion of a tax imposed under the Act. 63 The legislative history
does not explain Congress's motivation behind this bifurcation; the
House Committee Report merely stated that the new section "provide[d] penalties for failure to comply with the provisions
thereof."64 Presumably, Congress recognized that one could evade
or attempt to evade the tax due under the Act even though one did
.. 18 U.S.C. § 1621 (1988).
4. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341-1346 (1988).
Income Tax Law of 1913, ch. 16, § II(F), Pub. L. No. 63-16, 38 Stat. 114, 161-81 (1913)
. reprinted in 93 U.S. Revenue Acts, 1909-1950: The Laws, Legislative Histories' & Administrative Documents (Bernard D. Reams, Jr. ed. 1979). The language of this section appears to
have been derived from The Corporation Excise Tax Law of 1909, ch. 6, § 38, Pub. L. No.
61-6,36 Stat. 11, 112-17 (Eighth) (1909), which had imposed an excise tax on corporations
and other entities for carrying on or doing business.
•• Id. The language of § II(F) of the Income Tax Law of 1913 was reenacted without
substantial change in the Revenue Act of 1916, ch. 463, § 18, Pub. L. No. 64-271, 39 Stat.
756 (1916) reprinted in 93 Reams, supra note 49.
•, Ch. 63, Pub. L. No. 65-50, 40 Stat. 300 (1917) reprinted in 94 Reams, supra note 49.
•• Id. § 1004.
•s Id. These two offenses ultimately evolved into §§ 7206(1) and 7201, respectively, of the
present Code.
.. H.R. Rep. No. 45, 65th Cong., 1st Sess. 10 (1917) reprinted in 94 Reams, supra note 49.

4.
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not file a false or fraudulent return. lill
The language of the evasion. statute was changed once again in
the Revenue Act of 1918, which provided that one "who willfully
attempts in any manner to defeat or evade the tax imposed" by
the Act is guilty of a misdemeanor and subject to a maximum penalty of $10,000 and a maximum prison sentence of one year.56 This
provision was notable because, for the first time, the statute
dropped all mention of a completed act of evasion. Whereas the
1917 Act provided punishment for one who "evades or attempts to
evade" any tax imposed by the Act,57 the 1918 Act simply imposed
punishment on one "who willfully attempts in any manner to defeat or evade" a tax imposed by the Act. 58 Possibly, Congress reasoned that any completed act of evasion would necessarily include
an attempt, and because the statute prescribed the same punishment for the attempt as it did for the completed act, separate references to the attempt and the completed act were unnecessary.
However, the legislative history is also silent on the motivation behind these chang~s.59
The evasion statute underwent its final major revision in the
Revenue Act of 1924. 60 Section 1017(b) of that Act provided:
[A]ny person who willfully attempts in any manner to evade or defeat any tax imposed by this Act or the payment thereof, shall, in
addition to other penalties provided by law, be guilty of a felony
and, upon conviction thereof, be fined not more than $10,000, or
•• The division of the one offense into two separate offenses, willfully filing a false and
fraudulent return and willfully attempting to evade tax liability, which was first effected by
the Revenue Act of 1917, has made it possible to convict persons of the attempted evasion
of the tax law, even though they had no direct involvement in the filing of a false return.
See, e.g., United States v. Johnson, 319 U.S. 503 (1943) (defendants who held themselves
out as the sole owners of gambling houses in which defendant Johnson had an interest to
assist Johnson in evading his taxes, were guilty as aiders and abettors under evasion statute
even though they did not prepare or file Johnson's fraudulent returns); Imholte v. United
States, 226 F.2d 585 (8th Cir. 1955) (sales manager of automobile dealer who participated in
plan to conceal dealer's profit on sale of cars was guilty of aiding dealer in its evasion of
income tax even though he did not prepare or file dealer's fraudulent returns).
•e Revenue Act of 1918, ch. 18, § 253, Pub. L. No. 65-254, 40 Stat. 1057 (1919) reprinted
in 94 Reams, supra note 49.
57 Revenue Act of 1917, ch. 63, § 1004, Pub. L. No. 65-50, 40 Stat. 300 (1917).
•• Revenue Act of 1918, ch. 234, Pub. L. No. 68-175, 43 Stat. 253 (1924).
•• See H.R. Rep No. 767, 65th Cong., 2d Sess. 14-15 (1918) and S. Rep. No. 617,. 65th
Cong., 3d Sess. 9-10 (1918) reprinted in 94 Reams, supra note 49.
e. Revenue Act of 1924, ch. 234, Pub. L. No. 68-175, 43 Stat. 253 (1924) reprinted in 96
Reams, supra note 49.
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imprisoned for not more than flve years, or both, together with the
costs of prosecution. 6 !

The 1924 Act introduced two major revisions. First, income tax
evasion was upgraded from 'a misdemeanor to a felony and the
maximum prison sentence increased from one year to five years.
Second, the statute for the first time proscribed the attempted
evasion of the actual payment of the tax 62 in addition to the attempted evasion of the tax itself. These changes were added by the
Senate to the House bill, but again, the legislative history did not
reveal the reasons for these changes, except for the conclusion in
the Senate Finance Committee Report that the changes "provide a
more adequate system of penalties than was contained in the
House bill."63 The evasion statute has remained essentially unchanged from 1924 to the present, except for increases in the maximum fine. 64
., Id. § 1017(b).
•• The courts have recognized that (1) an attempt to evade or defeat the tax and (2) an
attempt to evade or defeat payment of the tax are separate and distinct offenses. In Cohen
v. United States, 297 F.2d 760 (9th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 369 U.S. 865 (1962), the taxpayer, Mickey Cohen, had previously been convicted for the years 1946, 1947, and 1948 of
attempting to evade or defeat the income tax by filing false returns. Subsequently, he was
convicted of attempting to evade or defeat the payment of tax for the years 1945 through
1950. The circuit court upheld the taxpayer's subsequent conviction against a claim of
double jeopardy notwithstanding the overlap of the three years on the ground that the evasion statute "does define ... two separate crimes, viz., attempt to evade or defeat tax and
attempt to evade or defeat payment of tax." Id. at 770. See also United States v. Mollet, 290
F.2d 273 (2d Cir. 1961) (willfully attempting to evade payments of taxes).
• s S. Rep. No. 398, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. 45-46 (1924) reprinted in 96 Reams, supra note
49. Discussion of the corresponding provision in the House bill is found in H.R. Rep. No.
179, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. 34 (1924) reprinted in 96 Reams, supra note 49.
•• Section 1017(b) of the Revenue Act of 1924 was adopted without change as § 1114(b) of
the Revenue Act of 1926, ch. 27, Pub. L. No. 69-20, 44 Stat. 9 (1926), reprinted in 97 Reams,
supra note 49, and § 1114(b) in turn was adopted without change (except that the word
"Act" was changed to "title") as § 145(b) of the Revenue Act of 1928, ch. 852, Pub. L. No.
70·562, 45 Stat. 791 (1928), reprinted in 71 Reams, supra note 49. Section 145(b) was
adopted without change as § 145(b) of the Revenue Act of 1932, ch. 209, Pub. L. No. 72-154,
47 Stat. 169 (1932), reprinted in 73 Reams, supra note 49, and § 145(b) was adopted without
change in the following successive Revenue Acts: Revenue Act of 1934, ch. 277, Pub. L. No.
73·216, 48 Stat. 680 (1934), reprinted in 75 Reams, supra note 49; Revenue Act of 1935, ch.
829, Pub. L. No. 74-407, 49 Stat. 1014 (1935), reprinted in 76 Reams, supra note 49; Revenue Act of 1936, ch. 690, Pub. L. No. 74-740, 49 Stat 1648 (1936), reprinted in 78 Reams,
supra note 49; Revenue Act of 1937, ch. 815, Pub. L. No. 75-377, 50 Stat. 813 (1937), reprinted in 79 Reams, supra note 49; Revenue Act of 1938, ch. 289, Pub. L. No. 75-664, 52
Stat. 447 (1938), reprinted in 81 Reams, supra note 49.
Section 145(b) was carried over without change (except that the word "title" was changed
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Aside from what may be gleaned from the words of the statute
itself, a question that will be addressed in the next section, the
legislative record is devoid of any indication whether Congress intended the underpayment of tax to be a prerequisite for conviction
under the evasion statute. As there is no explicit discussion or consideration of this issue in the record, it appears most likely that
Congress never contemplated the issue.

C.
1.

Judicial Development of the No-Tax-Due Defense

Origin of the No-Tax-Due Defense

The requirement that an additional tax must be due and owing
to sustain a conviction for attempted income tax evasion was established in O'Brien v. United States. 65 The case involved an individual taxpayer who had failed to file an income tax return for
1926. 66 The jury convicted the defendant of both a misdemeanor,
willfully failing to file a return for 1926, and a felony, willfully attempting to evade and defeat the tax for 1926.67 The conviction for
willful attempted evasion was based solely on the defendant's failure to file a return for 1926; there was no showing that the defendant had engaged in any other culpable act. 68 The defendant argued
to "chapter") as § 145(b) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1939, Pub. L. No. 76-1, 53 Stat.,
Part 1, reprinted in 104 Reams, supra note 49.
The part of § 145(b) dealing with attempted evasion was continued without substantive
change as § 7201 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954. The following changes have been
made in § 7201 since 1954:
(a) The Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-248, § 329(a), 96
Stat. 324, 618, increased the maximum monetary penalty from $10,000 to $100,000 ($500,000
in the case of a corporation).
(b) The Criminal Fine Enforcement Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-596, § 6(a), 98 Stat. 3134,
3137 enacted 18 U.S.C. § 3623, which increased the maximum monetary penalty to $250,000
($500,000 in the case of an organization). This provision, although modified and renumbered, has remained unchanged with respect to its application to a conviction under LR.C. §
7201.
•• 51 F.2d 193 (7th Cir. 1931), cert. den., 284 U.S. 673 (1931) .
•• Id. at 194-95.
• 7 Id. at 194, 196, 197-98. It appears from the court's statement of facts that the jury also
convicted the defendant of these two offenses for 1927 and 1928, id. at 194, but the court
only discusses the defendant's claim that he was being punished twice for the same offense
with respect to 1926, id. at 196.
•• See particularly Judge Alschuler's dissent, id. at 197. He stated, "[i]n each and all of
the counts the only conduct of the defendant charged as constituting the offense is his willful failure to make a return for the income tax." Id. at 198.
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that he was being punished twice for the same offense. 69 The majority rejected this claim by asserting that the elemerits of the two
crimes were distinct, stating:
[a] prosecution for a willful failure to file a return might be maintained although there was in fact no tax due. There could, however, be no such prosecution for a willful attempt to evade or defeat a tax unless there was some tax due from the taxpayer. 70

The emphasized portion of the above statement, which appears
to be the origin of the No-Tax-Due defense, constitutes the court's
entire "analysis" of this issue. The cryptic natur~ of the court's
remarks makes its rationale difficult to discern. Perhaps the court
had in mind a situation somewhat like the following: Taxpayer T
has wages of $10,000 and bank interest of $2000. T is also entitled
to a deduction for moving expenses in the amount of $2000. 71 Assuming a flat 50% tax rate and no exemptions, T's tax liability is
$5000. 72 In the situation where T omits his interest income in an
attempt to defraud the government, but also mistakenly fails to
claim the deduction for moving expenses through ignorance of the
Code, T inadvertently reports and pays the correct amount of tax.
The evasion statute proscribes the· willful "attempt[]... to
evade or defeat any tax imposed by this title."73 Possibly, the court
in O'Brien construed the phrase "any tax imposed by this title" as
meaning the actual dollar amount of ~he tax liability. Under this
reading the taxpayer in the above hypothetical could not be convicted of attempting to evade the tax, since he reported and paid
the correct amount of tax due. He never attempted to report or
pay less than the tax actually due. There are, however, two other
equally persuasive constructions of the statute.

8. Id. at 196
Id. at 196 (emphasis added).
See I.R.C. § 217.
71 Wages
$10,000
Interest
2,000
Gross income
12,000
Less:
Moving expenses
2,000
Taxable income
10,000
Taxed at 50%
5,000
73 I..R.C. § 7201. The relevant language of the statute in effect for the years involved in
the O'Brien case was virtually identical. See supra note 64 and accompanying text.
70
71
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First, Congress in using the phrase "any tax imposed by this title" may not have been referring to the dollar amount of tax owed,
but rather to the type of tax imposed by "this title." The title in
question, Title 26 of the United States Code (Internal Revenue Title), imposes many different types of taxes: income taxes,74 estate
and gift taxes,711 payroll taxes 76 and various excise taxes. 77 Under
this construction of the statute, the taxpayer in the above hypothetical would be guilty of attempted evasion since he attempted
to evade one of the types of taxes imposed by Title 26, namely the
income tax. This reading of the statute is consistent with the idea
that a taxpayer should not be exonerated from a charge of attempted tax evasion simply for failing to achieve his objective.
Furthermore, the tax liability of the taxpayer may be thought of
not as a unitary or indivisible amount, but as the sum of separate
taxes on each of the different components making up taxable income. Thus, in the above hypothetical, T's total tax liability may
thought of as consisting of three components: a tax on T's salary
income, a tax on T's interest income and a reduction in tax attributable to T's moving expenses. Under this construction of the statute, T would again be guilty under section 7201 because he evaded
the tax on the interest component of his income. The failure to
claim the moving expense deduction would not negate T's willful
omission of this interest income.
Clearly, linguistic analysis alone is inadequate to determine the
correct construction of the statute, and resort to the underlying
policies of the statute is necessary. This Article will argue that
public policy strongly supports either of the latter two constructions of the statute over the one apparently adopted by the
O'Brien court. For present purposes, suffice it to note that the
O'Brien decision, the fountainhead of the No-Tax-Due defense, is
deficient in both its linguistic and policy analysis.
The paucity of the court's analysis of the No-Tax-Due defense in
.O'Brien is undoubtedly attributable to the context in which the
issue arose. The case did not involve the assertion of the No-Tax~
Due defense; that is, it was not a case where the defendant mistak-

74
7&

7.
77

I.R.C.
I.R.C.
I.R.C.
I.R.C.

§ 1.
§ 2001.
§ 3101.
§§ 4001, 5001.
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enly believed additional tax was due and took steps to defeat the
tax he thought he owed. In O'Brien, the defendant did owe additional tax. 78 Discussion of the No-Tax-Due defense was collateral
to the' main issue before the O'Brien court. Rather, the court was
engaged in a theoretical exposition distinguishing the elements of
the two crimes of willful failure to file and willful attempted evasion in response to the defendant's contention that he was being
punished twice for the same offense. There is no evidence that the
court considered a situation where a taxpayer willfully attempted
to defeat a tax liability he believed to be owing but which in fact
was not. O'Brien thus constitutes weak authority for any rule that
purports to cover this factual situation. 79

2.

Subsequent Development of the No-Tax-Due Defense

Despite its jurisprudential weakness as authority, the O'Brien
principle that a conviction for willful attempted evasion of income
tax requires proof that the defendant owed tax over and above
that shown on his return quickly became black letter law, as it was
consistently reiterated by the circuit courts. As the Second Circuit
put it, to convict a defendant of attempted willful tax evasion, "the
government must prove not only an attempt wilfully to defraud it
but also that a tax in addition to what the taxpayer had already
O'Brien, 51 F.2d at 195.
The ultimate disposition of the issue involved in O'Brien-whether a conviction for
willful evasion could be based solely on the willful failure to file a return-further undermines its authority. In O'Brien, the court sustained such a conviction on the ground that
willful attempted evasion of the tax required proof of an additional element not required in
the case of willful failure to file a return, that is, that some tax was due and owing. 51 F.2d
at 197. In contrast, the Supreme Court ruled that a conviction for attempted income tax
evasion based on a failure to file an income tax return could not be sustained unless there
was some affirmative act of evasion in addition to the willful failure to file a tax return,
such as keeping a double set of books, making false entries or documents, or destroying
books or records. Spies v. United States, 317 U.S. 492, 499 (1943). The Supreme Court thus
ignored the O'Brien court's purported distinction between willful failure to file and willful
attempted income tax evasion. This does not mean that the O'Brien court was wrong in its
assertion that conviction of willful attempted evasion could only be sustained where some
tax was due and owing by the defendant; the Supreme Court did not address that issue.
Nevertheless, the very reason for the O'Brien court's assertion that conviction of willful
attempted evasion required proof that some tax was due and owing, that is, to justify a
conviction of willful attempted evasion based solely on the defendant's willful failure to file,
was rejected by the Supreme Court. This, combined with O'Brien court's lack of authority
or analysis for its conclusion, renders the decision weak authority indeed.
78

78
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paid remains due and owing."80 Yet even these black letter pronouncements were generally dicta; typically, ample proof that the
defendant actually owed additional tax existed. 81
Koontz v. United States,82 decided in 1960, appears to be the
first case in which the No-Tax-Due defense was squarely presented
to a court. 83 The government charged the defendant had willfully
attempted to defeat the tax by claiming his deceased wife as an
exemption. The defense argued that there could be no conviction,
since no additional tax was due:
[T]he fact that the return is mistakenly filled out, even willfully or
knowingly, alone does not constitute the offense. There must be
some loss of revenue to the government. in order to constitute the
offense. s4

The defendant wished to argue that he had mistakenly reported an
ordinary loss as a capital loss and that if he had correctly reported
this loss it would have eliminated his tax deficiency.85 The trial
80 United States v. Schenck, 126 F.2d 702, 704 (2d Cir.), cert. den. sub nom. Mosko'witz v.
United States, 316 U.S. 705 (1942).
81 For example, in the following cases, the courts stated the rule that there could be no
conviction for attempted income tax evasion without a tax deficiency, but sustained the
convictions under review since they found sufficient evidence of a tax deficiency: Elwert v.
United States, 231 F.2d 928, 932 (9th Cir. 1956); United States v. Schenck, 126 F.2d 702,
704 (2d Cir.), cert. den. sub nom. Moskowitz v. United States, 316 U.S. 705 (1942); Gleckman v. United States, 80 F.2d 394, 399 '(8th Cir. 1935), cert. den., 297 U.S. 709 (1936);
Tinkoff v. United States, 86 F.2d 868, 878 (7th Cir.), cert. den., 301 U.S. 689 (1937); United
States v. Miro, 60 F.2d 58, 61 (2d Cir. 1932).
82 277 F.2d 53 (5th Cir. 1960).
83 McClanahan v. United States, 272 F.2d 663 (5th Cir. 1959), which was decided prior to
Koontz, is sometimes cited for the proposition that a conviction for attempted income tax
evasion can be sustained only if there is a tax deficiency. See, e.g., Koontz, 272 F.2d at 55
n.2. In McClanahan, the defendant had unreported gambling winnings that he asserted
were more than offset by his unreported gambling losses. The court reversed his conviction
because an answer given by the trial court to a question by the jury may have misled the
jurors into believing that the defendant's mere failure to report his winnings was a sufficient
ground for conviction. McClanahan, 272 F.2d at 666-67. It is not clear that the court was
holding that a tax deficiency was an essential element for conviction for attempted tax evasion; it may simply have been holding that if the defendant's winnings were offset by his
losses, this could negate a finding that defendant intended to defraud the Government of
revenue. Intent to defraud is, of course, an essential element for conviction under the evasion statute. In its full blown form, the No-Tax-Due defense holds that even where the
defendant intends to defraud the government, there must be a tax deficiency to sustain Ii
conviction.
84 Koontz, 277 F.2d at 54 (emphasis added).
8. Id.
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court refused to permit this defense to be presented to the jury.86
On appeal, defendant's conviction was reversed and the case remanded to the trial court with instructions to allow this No-TaxDue defense to be presented to the jury.87
The appellate decision is disappointing because the court gave
no analysis or reasoning justifying the No-Tax-Due defense. The
court simply cited cases reiterating the oft-repeated statement that
a conviction of attempted willful tax evasion required proof that
some additional tax was due and owing. 88 It was in this manner
that the the No-Tax-Due defense was established: first it was
stated by the O'Brien court without analysis or authority in a case
in which the defense did not apply; then it was repeated as dicta in
numerous cases; and finally it was' accepted as the law in Koontz
on the basis of the foregoing "authority."

3.

The Government's Reaction

The first, albeit belated, government attack on the rationale of
the No-Tax-Due defense occurred in United States v. Wilkins. 89
The case involved a defendant who sold real property in 1958 subject to his obligation to make improvements on the property.90
These improvements were not completed until 1960. 91 The defendant purportedly elected to report his gain on the transaction on the
"completed contract" method of reporting gain. 92 Under the law
then in effect, this method allowed a taxpayer to delay reporting
gains until the completion of the contract. 93
.e

Id. at 54-55.

'7 Id. at 55.
•• The court relied on Clark v. United States, 211 F.2d 100 (8th Cir. 1954), cert. den., 348
U.S. 911 (1955), United States v. Bender, 218 F.2d 869 (7th Cir.), cert. den., 349 U.S. 920
(1955), Elwert v. United States, 231 F.2d 928 (9th Cir. 1956) and McClanahan v. United
States, 272 F.2d 663 (5th Cir. 1959). Koontz, 277 F.2d at 55 n.2. The statements in Clark,
Bender, and Elwert that a tax deficiency is essential for conviction under the evasion statute were dicta, since in each case the court sustained a finding that a tax deficiency existed.
In McClanahan, the circuit court reversed a guilty verdict to a charge of tax evasion on the
basis of an erroneous answer the trial judge gave to the jury. It is unclear whether the circuit
court held that a deficiency was essential to a conviction under the evasion statute. See
.
discussion of McClanahan, supra note 83.
•• 385 F.2d 465 (4th Cir. 1967), cert. den., 390 U.S. 951 (1968).
•• Id. at 467.
•, Id.
•• Id.
•• Id. at 468. See also Treas. Reg. § 1.451-3 (1960).
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The government proved that when the taxpayer reported his
gain in 1960, he understated that gain by more than $39,000. 94 In a
three-step argument, the defendant asserted that he could not be
convicted of willful attempted income tax evasion for 1960 because
no additional tax was due and owing for that year. First, the defendant successfully argued that he had improperly elected the
completed contract method of reporting gain. 95 Second, because
the completed contract method of reporting was inappropriate, the
defendant should have reported the gain on his sale of the property in 1958, not in 1960. As a result, the defendant's taxable income for 1960 was in fact overstated, not understated. 96 Finally,
the defendant asserted that he could J)ot be convicted for his failure to report the gain in 1958 because because that year was
barred by the statute of limitations. 97
The government argued that:
Wilkins is charged . . . with an attempt to evade taxes and that
when he filed his return in 1960 if he was attempting to avoid what
he felt were taxes due for that year a jury could find him guilty of
violating ... § 7201 irrespective of any civil liability [for unpaid
taxes].98

The court, in allowing the defendant to introduce the No-TaxDue defense, held that the law was clearly to the contrary: "[T]he'
pronouncements of the courts make it clear that an essential element of the offense of attempting to evade taxes due in any given
year is the existence of a deficiency for that year although the statute does not specifically so provide. "99
4,

The Supreme Court Speaks

The Supreme Court added its imprimatur by way of dictum to
the rule that a conviction for attempted income tax evasion could
only be sustained where there was a tax deficiency for the year in
question. In Lawn v, United States,100 defendant Livorsi was
•• Wilkins, 385 F,2d at 467.
•• Id. at 469,
•• Id.
• 7 Id, at 468.
•• Id,
•• Id,
100 355 U.S, 339 (1958),
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charged with willfully attempting to evade the payment of income
tax for 1946 for underreporting his income from Eatsum Food
Products Co., Ltd., a partnership, and for understating his income
from Tavern Fruit Juice CO.IO I The issue with respect to EaJsum
was complicated because Livorsi had held his interest in Eatsum
for only a part of the partnership's taxable year. 102 The trial judge'
simplified the situation by instructing the jury that in considering
Livorsi's guilt or innocence for 1946, it was not to "consider Eatsum at all."103 On appeal, Livorsi's attorney argued that the judge's
charge in effect reduced Livorsi's taxable income for 1946 by the
amount of income he had reported for Eatsum. 104 Thus, he argued,
the jury could not find Livorsi guilty of income tax evasion because
this "reduction" in his income for 1946 would more than offset the'
unreported income from Tavern. l05 The Court, per Justice Whittaker, rejected this contention:
While, of course, a conviction upon a charge of attempting to
evade assessment of income taxes by the filing of a fraudulent
return cannot stand in the absence of proof of a deficiency, the
court's charge did not create the credit claimed by Livorsi. It only
withdrew from the jury's consideration the Governme~t's claim
that his income from Eatsum in that year was . . . more that he
reported in his return. 106

The Supreme Court's endorsement of the No-Tax-Due defense in
the above quotation bears striking resemblance to the analysis of
the lower courts: it made no reasoned analysis of the issue, cited no
authority for the validity of its assertion, and its statement was
dictum because the Court sustained the jury's finding that the taxpayer owed additional tax.
Lawn was followed by Sansone v. United States,t°7 where the
Supreme Court again stated in dictum that a conviction for willful
attempted evasion of income tax could only be sustained where the
defendant owed additional tax.IOS The Court, in illustrating how a
101
102
103
104
106
108
107
'08

Id. at 360.
Id. at 360-61
Id. at 361.
Id.
Id.
Id. (emphasis added).
380 U.S. 343 (1965).
Id. at 351.
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taxpayer could be guilty of willfully making a materially false and
fraudulent statement on his return without also being guilty of attempted income tax evasion, stated:
This may be the case, for example, where a taxpayer understates
his gross receipts and he offsets this by also understating his deductible expenses . . . . [1]f the jury believed that an understatement of deductible expenses had offset the understatement of
gross receipts, while the defendant would have violated §7207 by
willfully making a material false and fraudulent statement on his
return, he would not have violated §7201 as there would not have
been the requisite §7201 element of a tax deficiency.lo9

The Court cited only Lawn and an earlier Supreme Court case,
Spies v. United States,110 as authority for the proposition that a
conviction under section 7201 required a tax deficiency.lll However, Lawn only supported this proposition in dictum, and a review
of Spies shows that the Supreme Court simply did not address the
issue at all. Again, the Court did not offer any reasoning or analysis that supported the validity of the proposition.
The effect of these Supreme Court opinions on lower court decisions is illustrated by United States v. Petti. 1l2 In this case, the
evidence showed that the defendant was a "ten-percenter," that is,
a person who cashes racetrack tickets for the true owner of the
ticket and then signs Treasury Form 1099 identifying himself as
the winner in exchange for a 10 percent commission. 1l3 The "tenpercenter" then reports the winnings as his own, but typically offsets them with his own real losses, resulting in a net loss of tax
revenue for the Treasury.1l4 In the case, Special Agents of the
Treasury Department observed defendant approaching and speaking to people in the cashier's line for "Big Exacta" pay offs, and
discovered that the defendant had cashed a winning ticket and filled out the Treasury Department form listing himself as the win-.
nero
Later, the . agents observed the defendant in the men's room
.
passing a large sum of money to a person later identified as McIn-

109
110

III
112
113
114

Id. at 352-53.
317 U.S. 492 (1942).
Sansone, 380 U.S. at 351.
448 F.2d 1257 (3rd Cir. 1971).
Id. at 1257-58.
Id. at 1258.
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tyre who correspondingly handed the defendant a smaller amount
of money.lUi While the ten-percenter was tried and convicted of
violating section 7201 for having attempted to assist McIntyre in
evading· his tax liability, 116 there was no evidence that McIntyre
understated his income or had a tax deficiency for the year in
question. 117 One can surmise that McIntyre, aware of the arrest of
the defendant, scrupulously reported in full his winnings from the
race. The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed because
of the absence of any proof of a tax deficiency:
Indeed, the Government concedes that there are numerous cases
holding that proof of a tax deficiency is a prerequisite to conviction
under the statute here involved. It points out, however, that the
statute does not explicitly contain such a requirement. From this
statement we infer that the Government disagrees with the holdings of the cited cases. But we are not legally free to disagree with
such controlling Supreme Court precedents as Sansone v. United
States. . . .
.
The Government's position is that defendant willfully attempted
to evade and defeat the tax of McIntyre at the time he cashed the
ticket in question and that the subsequent reporting of the proceeds for tax purposes by McIntyre is irrelevant. The Government
relies on certain language of the Supreme Court in Spies v. United·
States ... which notes that a prosecution under the statute can
only be for the attempt and that the crime is complete "when the
attempt is complete." The Government says the attempt was complete when the defendant cashed the ticket for McIntyre and completed the 1099 Form and met with McIntyre to pass the money.
The short answer is that in Sansone v. United States . . . , the
court cited Spies for the proposition that the existence of a tax
deficiency is required for conviction under §7201. 118
Importantly, the court did not attempt to justify its decisi.on in
terms of statutory language, history, policy or logic. It did not even
endorse the Supreme Court's citation of Spies for the proposition
that conviction under section 7201 requires proof of a tax defi"' Id.
118 Under ·the tax evasion statute, one can be convicted of attempting to evade another
person's tax liability. See, e.g., United States v. Troy, 293 U.S. 58 (1934) (corporate president indictable for evading corporation's income tax by filing false corporate return under §
146 of the Internal Revenue Act of 1928).
117 United States v. Petti, 448 F.2d 1257, 1258 (3d Cir. 1971).
110 Id. (citations omitted).
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ciency. Rather its decision rested solely on the compulsion of authority, particularly Supreme Court pronouncements. But as previously discussed, this weighty authority was grounded in a
foundation of sand.
As this recital of the cases shows, the courts have been singularly
deficient in analyzing the policy issues implicated by the No-TaxDue defense. We will attempt to explore these issues below. To
assist us in this endeavor, we will first review the analogous impossibility defense in the law of attempt.
IV.

THE IMPOSSIBILITY DEFENSE IN THE LAW OF ATTEMPT AND ITS
RELATIONSHIP TO THE No-TAX-DuE DEFENSE

A.

Preliminary Observations

An unsuccessful attempt to commit a crime was not fully recognized as a common law crime until the late eighteenth century.H9
In early English jurisprudence, an unsuccessful attempt was not
punished as a crime because no harm was done. 12o The courts gradually recognized that an attempt to commit a crime that came dangerously close to consummation posed a threat to public safety and
required intervention by the criminal law. 121
This original justification for the law of attempt has tended to
set the boundaries for culpable actions. For example, because preliminary preparations for the commission of a crime do not come
. dangerously close to the actual commission of a crime, the doctrine
119 The modern law of 'attempt is usually traced back to Rex v. Scofield, 1784 Cald. 397,
where Lord Mansfield held: "The intent may make an act, innocent in itself, criminal; nor is
the completion of an act, criminal in itself, necessary to constitute criminality." Id. at 400
(quoted in Francis B. Sayre, Criminal Attempts, 41 Harv. L. Rev. 821, 835 (1928». The
evolution of the law of attempt is reviewed in Wayne R. Lafave & Austin W. Scott, Jr.,
Criminal Law § 6.2(a) (2d ed. 1986).
120 See 2 Bracton, On the Laws and Customs of England 361 (George E. Woodbine ed. &
Samuel E. Thorne trans., Belknap Press 1968). Bracton states "[W)hat harm was there in
the attempt when the wrongful act produced no effect?"; 2 Frederick Pollock & Frederic W.
Maitland, The History of English Law 508 nA (2d ed. reissued 1968 & reprinted 1978).
Professor Ryu has observed that recognition of the crime of attempt also occurred late in
continental jurisprudence. Paul Kichyun Ryu, Contemporary Problems of Criminal At.
tempts, 32 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1170, 1171-72 (1957).
121 Professor Ryu attributes the development of the law of attempt both in England and
on the Continent to the "emergence of the strong'centralized state, concerned not with reparation of private or public damage but with assertion of the state's authority in preserving
public order." Ryu, supra note 120, at 1172.
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developed that "mere preparation" does not constitute a criminal
attempt. 122 Likewise, some courts developed the rule that if successful completion of a crime was "impossible," there was no crimin~l attempt. Again, the notion is that the defendant's actions pose
no danger to society because no harm will occur even if the defendant completes his actions. 123 As will be discussed below, the impossibility doctrine has had a long and contentious history.
The No-Tax-Due defense bears a striking similarity to the impossibility defense in the law of attempt. Consider the following
case. D buys a substance he believes to be cocaine and then sells it
to another. The substance is actually sugar. Although D cannot be
convicted of selling cocaine, because he did not actually sell cocaine, the issue of whether D can be found guilty of attempting to
sell cocaine remains. Some courts would acquit the defendant in
these circumstances on the ground that successful completion of
the substantive crime was impossible; even though D completed all
of the acts he intended, he had not, and on these facts could not,
commit the substantive crime of selling a controlled substance. 124
Compare this case with the fictitious dependent hypothetical described in Part II. In both situations, the defendants had the req.uisite mens rea and completed all of their intended acts, but never122 This concept of "proximate danger" was Holmes's explanation for why the law does
not punish as an attempt every act done with the intent to bring about a crime:
Eminent judges have been puzzled where to draw the line [between mere preparation
and criminal attempt]
Public policy [is] ... at the bottom of the matter; the
considerations being
the nearness of the danger, the greatness of the harm, and
the degree of apprehension felt. When a man ... starts on a journey meaning to
murder at the end of it, there is still a considerable chance that he will change his
mind before he comes to the point. But when he has ... cocked and aimed the pistol,
there isyery little chance that he will not persist to the end, and the danger becomes
so great that the law steps in.
Oliver w. Holmes, The Common Law 56 (Mark DeWolfe Howe ed., MacMillan 1968) (1881).
123 For an analysis of how the competing theories of the "impossibility" defense are based
on different conceptions of danger, see R. J.' Spjut, When Is an Attempt to Commit an
Impossible Crime a Criminal Act?, 29 Ariz. L. Rev. 247, 249-71 (1987).
124 Courts that recognize the Legal Impossibility II defense (see discussion infra part
IV.B-C) would acquit the would-be cocaine seller. In United States v. Oviedo, the court
acquitted, under a variation of the Legal Impossibility II defense, a defendant who sold a
noncontrolled substance believing it to be heroin, 525 F.2d 881 (5th Cir. 1976). But see
People v. Siu, 271 P.2d 575 (Cal. 1954) (defendant convicted of attempting to possess narcotics when he obtained possession of talcum believing it to be narcotics); United States v.
Roman, 356 F. Supp. 434 (S.D.N.Y.), affd, 484 F.2d 1271 (2d Cir.1973), cert den., 415 U.S.
978 (1974) (defandant convicted of attempt to possess narcotics when he obtained soap powder believing it to be narcotics).
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theless failed to commit a substantive offense. And in both cases,
the defendant could be acquited under either the rubric of impossibility, or the No-Tax-Due defense.
The similarity of the above cases suggests it would be worthwhile to examine the impossibility defense in the law of attempt in
the effort to determine the proper scope of the No-Tax-Due
defense.
B.

The Different Species of Impossibility

To fully understand the impossibility defense, three different
species of impossibility must be distinguished: factual impossibility, and two types of legal impossibility, a narrow version (Legal
Impossibility I), and a broad version (Legal Impossibility II).
Factual impossibility describes the case where the objective
sought by the defendant is a crime, but because of some fact unknown to the defendant the objective cannot physically be
achieved. 125 The classic case is that of a defendant who, with intent
to murder his victim, pulls the trigger of a gun he believes to be
loaded, but that is fact unloaded. 126 Another involves a pickpocket
who thrusts his hand into another's pocket only to find the pocket
empty.127 Traditionally, factual impossibility does not constitute a
defense, and virtually all American courts convict defendants of·
attempt under these circumstances. 126
12. Different formulations of factual impossibility may be found in Graham Hughes, One
Further Footnote on Attempting the Impossible, 42 N.Y.V. L. Rev. 1005, 1006-07 (1967);
Jerome B. Elkind, Impossibility in Criminal Attempts: A Theorist's Headache, 54 Va. L.
Rev. 20, 21 (1968); Jerome Hall, General Principles of Criminal Law 586-87 (2d ed. 1960);
Lafave & Scott, supra note 119, § 6.3, at 511.
126 See State v. Damms, 100 N.W.2d 592 (Wis. 1960); State v. Wiley, 216 N.W. 866 (S.D.
1927).
127 See People v. Fiegelman, 91 P.2d 156 (Cal. 1939); State v. Wilson, 30 Conn. 500 (1862);
People v. Moran, 25 N.E. 412 (N.Y. 1890). See also authorities cited in Model Penal Code §
5.01 nn.33-34 (Proposed Official Draft 1962).
126 Lafave & Scott, supra note 119, § 6.3(a)(2); Hall, supra note 125, at 586-87; Spjut,
supra note 123, at 256-57; Thomas Weigend, Why Lady Eldon Should Be Acquitted: The
Social Harm in Attempting the Impossible, 27 DePaul L. Rev. 231, 235 (1977).
One caveat must be made to the above generalization. There are a group of cases where
the means chosen or used by the defendant are so obviously incapable of accomplishing the
defendant's illegal end that one may be hesitant to convict. The classic case is that of a
voodoo doctor who, with intent to kill, chants maledictions upon his intended victim, or
sticks pins into a voodoo doll representing the victim. See Commonwealth v. Johnson, 167
A. 344, 347-50 (Pa. 1933) (Maxey, J., dissenting) and Pollock's opinion in Attorney General
v. Sillem, 159 Eng. Rep. 178, 221 (1863). Jerome Hall has somewhat contemptuously labeled
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Legal Impossibility I exists where the acts planned or perpetrated by the defendant are believed by the defendant to constitute a crime, but in fact do not constitute a crime as defined by
law. 129 Some commentators use the expression "imaginary offenses" or "illusory crimes" to describe Legal Impossibility I
cases. 130 A famous example involves Lady Eldon's attempt to
smuggle expensive French lace into England the day after French
lace has been removed from the list of dutiable articles. 131
Commentators universally agree that defendants should not be
convicted of attempt in Legal Impossibility I cases. 132 To do otherwise would, according to Glanville Williams, violate the principle
of legality, for then "the law of atteJIlpt would be used to manufacture a new crime, when the legislature has left the situation outside
of the ambit of the law."133
While the commentators and courts are in virtually unanimous
agreement over the proper disposition of cases involving factual

this class of cases as cases from "Never-Never Land", Hall, supra note 125, at 593-94, since
these supposed cases have never occurred, and probably never will occur, in actual litigation,
but have arisen only as hypotheticals imagined by judges or commentators. His implication
is that such cases should not be allowed to confuse analysis of real life cases.
Virtually all commentators would acquit in these cases. See, e.g., George Fletcher, Rethinking Criminal Law 149, 165-66 (1978); Hughes, supra note 125, at 1030, 1033. Even
Professors Williams and Hall, who usually determine a defendant's guilt on the basis of his
subjective perceptions, would probably acquit in these cases: Williams on the ground that
such actions do not pose a "social danger," Glanville Williams, Criminal Law: The General
Part § 207(0 (2d ed. 1961); Hall on the ground that such actions do not pose an "objective
risk." Hall, supra note 125, at 591-94.
The Model Penal Code would disallow the impossibility defense even here, but would
permit the court to reduce the degree of the crime, or in an extreme case, to dismiss the
prosecution altogether where the "conduct charged. . . is so inherently unlikely to result or
culminate in the commission of a crime that neither such conduct nor the actor presents a
public danger." Model Penal Code § 5.05(2) (Proposed Official Draft 1962).
"9 Legal Impossibility I (as defined in this article) is discussed in Hughes, supra note 125,
at 1006; Weigend, supra note 128, at 235-36; Williams, supra note 128, § 205; Lafave &
Scott, supra note 119, § 6.3(a)(3); Hall, supra note 175, at 586. Even the Reporters for the
Model Penal Code, who purport to reject the impossibility defense, see Model Penal Code §
5.01 commentary at 307 (Proposed Official Draft 1962), recognize that conviction for attempt would be improper where "the result desired or intended is not a crime, ... even
though [the actor1 firmly believes that his goal is criminal." Id. at 318.
130 Weigend, supra note 128, at 235-36; Ryu, supra note 120, at 1186 (German theorists
use the term Wahnverbrechen (illusory crime».
131 Sanford H. Kadish & Stephen J. Schulhofer, Criminal Law and Its Processes 672-73
(5th ed. 1989).
13. See authorities cited supra note 129.
133 Williams, supra note 128, § 205.
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impossibility and Legal Impossibility I, they are split regarding Legal Impossibility II. Legal Impossibility II describes those cases
where no substantive crime would be committed even .if the defendant took all the physical steps he intended, and even though
the immediate physical result he intended occurs, because an essential element of the legal definition of the substantive crime is
missing. ls4 An example would be the cocaine case previously described: D, with intent to violate the law, sold a substance he believed to be cocaine which turned out to be sugar. D took all the
physical steps he intended, that is, he transferred the substance to
the buyer. The immediate physical result he intended occurred,
that is, the buyer purchased the substance. But, because of a fact
that D was unaware of, specifically the fact that the substance was
sugar and not cocaine, an essential element of the completed substantive crime is missing. Another example is found in United
States v. Berrigan. lslI Father Berrigan, while imprisoned, smuggled
letters out of a federal penitentiary.ls6 Federal law criminalized the
sending, or attempted sending, of letters out of a prison without
the knowledge and consent of the warden. ls7 In fact, the warden
knew that Berrigan was transmitting the letters. ls8 Father Berrigan
had taken all the steps he intended when he entrusted the letters
to a courier. The immediate physical result he intended occurred:
the letters were taken out of the prison and delivered. Nonetheless,
because of a fact that Father Berrigan was unaware of, namely the
warden's knowledge that the letters were being sent, an essential
element of the completed crime was missing.
Legal Impossibility II cases should be distinguished from Legal
Impossibility I cases and factual impossibility cases. In a Legal Impossibility I case, the defendant has a misapprehension about the

'34 Legal Impossibility II is discussed in Arnold N. Enker, Impossibility in Criminal Attempts-Legality and the Legal Process, 53 Minn. L. Rev. 665, 667 (1969)("[D]efendant has
committed the forbidden act in its narrow sense-he has forcefully penetrated his intended
rape victim, or he has secured possession of the forbidden goods-but one of the external
elements of the substantive crime ... is absent: the woman was his wife, or the goods were
not in fact stolen."); Weigend, supra note 128. Weigend stated, "one additional circumstance
which is part of the legal definition of the offense is, without the actor's knowledge, missing
in fact." Id. at 237.
130 482 F.2d 171 (3d Cir. 1973).
13. Id. at 173.
137 Id.
'3. Id. at 184.
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law, while in a Legal Impossibility II case, the defendant is mistaken about the facts. 139 In factual impossibility cases, the physical
result intended or desired .by the defendant constitutes a criminal
offense, whereas in Legal Impossibility II cases the immediately intended physical results are not criminal. While these classifications
are not perfect and frequently prove difficult to apply in practice,140 they are nevertheless useful in tracing the jurisprudential
•
13. Professor Hughes gives an extended discussion of this distinction. Hughes, supra note
125, at 1016-23.
14. The major classification problem seems to stem from the difficulty of defining the
defendant's "intent" for the purpose of distinguishing between cases of factual impossibility
and Legal Impossibility II. In the case of the would-be cocaine seller, did the defendant
merely "intend" to sell the white powdered substance in his possession, a Legal Impossibility II case, or did he "intend" to sell cocaine, a factual impossibility case?
Professor Keedy attempts to solve this problem by distinguishing between "intent" and
"motive, desire and expectation." Edwin R. Keedy, Criminal Attempts at Common Law, 102
U. Pa. L. Rev. 464, 466-67 (1954). Thus, he would say that a person who took an umbrella
believing it belonged to another, but that in fact is his own, did not "intend" to steal the
umbrella, although his motive, desire and expectation may have been to take another's umbrella. Thus, Keedy would acquit him of attempted theft. Id. Keedy would presumably acquit the would-be cocaine seller because he did not "intend" to sell cocaine; rather he intended to sell the white powder in his hands which was sugar, although he desired and
expected to sell cocaine.
Likewise, Professor Perkins distinguishes between "primary" and "secondary" intent to
argue for acquittal in this type of case. Rollin M. Perkins, Criminal Attempt and Related
Problems, 2 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 319, 330-32 (1955).
As Professor Hughes points out, the difficulty with these proposed tests is that they are
unworkable in practice, do not conform to the general usage of the English language, and do
not embody any sound principle of morality or public policy. Hughes, supra note 125, at
1012.
Professor Fletcher has succeeded in developing a more workable test of intent which he
has referred to as the "rational motivation" test:
The only way to determine whether the actor is attempting an act that includes a
particular circumstance, X, is to inquire: what would the actor do if he knew that X
was not so? If he would behave in precisely the same way, we cannot say that his
mistaken belief in X bears on his motivation; and if it does not, we cannot say that he
is attempting to act with reference to X.
Fletcher, supra note 128, § 3.3.4. Thus, in the case of the would-be cocaine seller, he would
ask whether the accused would have sold the substance if he knew it was sugar. If the answer is "yes," then Professor Fletcher' would say it was not the defendant's "intent" to sell
cocaine, because whether the substance was or was not cocaine had no bearing on the defendant's actions. Professor Fletcher suggests that the accused's answer to this hypothetical
question would probably be "yes," since the "seller ... is interested in getting the going
price for ... [cocaine] and presumably would be pleased to learn that he was not parting
with the real stuff." George P. Fletcher, Constructing a Theory of Impossible Attempts, 5
Crim. Just. Ethics 53, 62-63 (1986).
In the author's view, Professor Fletcher's test, though superficially attractive, still lacks
workability. For example, the would-be seller of cocaine might well be concerned with
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development of the impossibility defense.

C. Evolving Rationales of the Impossibility Defense
Commentators and jurists originally viewed the problem of impossibility as a matter of logic. An attempt was thought of as the
commencement of a crime. It seemed to follow as a logical corollary that there could be no attempt if the completion of the defendant's actions would not result in a crime. 141 At one time, the
English courts applied this principle to hold that a pickpocket who
thrust his hands into an empty pocket could not be convicted of
attempted theft because the defendant could not have stolen any
property.142 This doctrine never became a part of American law,
and it is now universally established that factual impossibility is
not a defense to a charge of attempt.143
The battle next shifted to Legal Impossibility II cases, where it
has remained ever since. Possibly the most famous American case
sustaining Legal Impossibility II as a defense is People v. Jaffe. 144
Jaffe had several times before bought and received goods stolen by
an employee of a dry goods store. 1411 On the occasion in question,

whether the substance was cocaine or not; if it were sugar, it might adversely affect his
"business reputation" with his "clientele." Thus, the "rational motivation" test does not
give clear answers to the question of the defendant's intent, but merely invites further factual inquiry. Moreover, it is unclear why the answer to this question should, as a matter of
policy, have any bearing on whether the defendant is convicted or not. See Hughes, supra
note 125, at 1013-16.
.. , See Ryu, supra note 120, at 1183.
... Regina v. Collins, 169 Eng. Rep. 1477 (1864). Collins was thought to have been overruled in Regina v. Ring, 17 Cox C.C. 491 (1892), reprinted in Cox, 17 Criminal Law Cases
491 (1895). However, the House of Lords shook the seemingly settled state of the law in
1973 when it suggested that Collins, not Ring, was a correct statement of the law. Haughton
v. Smith [1973] 3 All E.R. 1109. Lord Hailsham LC, stated in his comment, "[I]n general I
regard the reasoning in ... [Collins] as sound and ... the purported overruling of [Collins]
needs further consideration." Id. at 1117. See also Lord Reid's comment, where he stated,
"[T]he,easoning of the learned judges who took part in [Collins] appears to me to be convincing." Id. at 1120. In Anderton v. Ryan, [1985] 2 All E.R. 355, their Lordships expressed
the view in dicta that the Criminal Attempts Act, 1981, ch. 47 (Eng.), had the effect of
making a pickpocket who put his hand in an empty pocket with intent to steal guilty of
attempted theft. Lord Roskill, in his comment, stated, "[Criminal Attempts Act]
[s]ubsection (2) has at least removed the viability of what became known as the pickpocket's defence." Anderton, [1985] 2 All E.R. at 364.
... See authorities cited supra note 128.
,•• 78 N.E. 169, reh'g den., 79 N.E. 113 (N.Y. 1906)
,.. Id. at 170.
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the store discovered that the employee had stolen a quantity of
Italian cloth to sell to Jaffe, and repossessed the stolen cloth. 146 To
snare Jaffe, it was arranged for the employee to take the cloth to
Jaffe and to sell it to him as previously agreed. 147 Jaffe paid about
half the normal price for the cloth. 146 Jaffe, of course, could not be
convicted of the substantive crime of receiving stolen goods as the
goods were no longer stolen; they had been returned to the possession of the owner and were sold by the owner's employee to Jaffe
with its permission. Jaffe was, however, convicted of attempting to
receive stolen goods. 149 On appeal, the New York Court of Appeals
reversed, on the ground that the defendant's actions, even if carried to their intended completion, would not result in a crime, but
only in the purchase or receipt of unstolen cloth. 111o The court distinguished the "empty pocket cases" on the ground that in those
cases, the result intended or desired by the defendant-pickpocket,
namely, the removal of property from the intended victim's pocket,
was a crime. In contrast, in Jaffe the result intended by the defendant, the purchase of Italian cloth, was not a crime. m
The result in Jaffe was, and continues to be, vigorously criticized. These critics, sometimes called "subjectivists,"1112 argue as
follows: Jaffe, like other defendants in Legal Impossibility II cases,
was just as morally culpable as if the doth had been stolen, since
he believed it to be stolen. Moreover, Jaffe demonstrated his dangerousness to society, that is, his propensity to commit crime, since
... Id. at 170-71.
. . 7 Id. at 171.
1" Id.
... Id. at 169.
'.0 Id. at 170.
10' Id. at 169. The House of Lords reached the same result as in Jaffe on similar facts in
Haughton v. Smith, [1973) 3 All E.R. 1109. Thereafter, Parliament passed the Criminal
Attempts Act, 1981, ch. 47 (Eng.), which provided that the actor's guilt was to be determined as "if the facts of the case had been as he believed them to be." Id. § 1(3). Notwithstanding this Act, the House of Lords held in Anderton v. Ryan, [1985) 2 All E.R. 355, that
a person who brought goods she thought to be stolen was not guilty of attempted receipt of
stolen property unless the prosecution could prove that the goods were stolen. However, the
House of Lords overruled the Ryan decision the following year in R. v. Shivpuri, [1986) 2
All E.R. 334. For other decisions on this issue, see Model Penal Code § 5.01 commentary at
307 n.28 (Proposed Official Draft 1962).
102 This is the term used by Professor Fletcher, and is derived from the fact that "subjectivists" would judge a defendant's guilt on the basis of his subjective perceptions. See
George P. Fletcher, Constructing a Theory of Impossibility Attempts, 5 Crim. Just. Ethics
53, 54-55.
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he undertook all steps within his power to bring about the criminal
act.
Subjectivists argue that it is contrary to morality and sound social policy to acquit a defendant in this position just because some
fortuitous fact, of which the defendant was unaware, renders completion of the substantive crime legally impossible. IllS Subjectivists
therefore reject Legal Impossibility II as a defense and would restrict the impossibility defense solely to cases of Legal Impossibility I.
This position has enjoyed substantial support among academic
commentators and, over time, has won increasing support from legislators. Professor Fletcher, writing in 1986, described the apparent
demise of the Legal Impossibility II defense: "The overwhelming
weight of authority, the Model Penal Code, the trend in State legislation, in the courts, and in the academic literature, requires the
facts to be assessed as the defendant believes them to be."Ili4 Likewise, the English Parliament in the comprehensive 1981 Criminal
Attempts Act rejected the Legal Impossibility II defense by requiring that a defendant's guilt be judged on the basis of the "facts
... as he believed them to be."II111 Even New York, home of the
Jaffe decision, legislatively overruled that decision in 1967. 1116
And yet, despite this seemingly irresistible trend, the Legal Impossibility II defense seems to have recently gained new adherents,
"neo-objectivists," both academic and judicial. These proponents
of the defense base their arguments not on the supposedly inexorable dictates of logic, but on their concerns about the fundamental
nature of the criminal legal system: the relationship of the ordinary citizen to the state; the danger of unlimited, or at least, insufficiently limited, police and prosecutorial discretion; and judicial
resort to inherently unreliable and prejudicial evidence. I117
103 See Model Penal Code § 5.01 commentary at 315-20 (Proposed Official Draft 1962);
Williams, supra note 128, § 207(b) ("[T)here is danger to the public in leaving uncorrected a
man who is bent on murder") and § 207(0 ("[F)or one who administers salt thinking salt to
be poisonous is somewhat dangerous; when he fails with salt he may hit on weedkiller");
Hall, supra note 125, 591-94 (stressing objective risks posed by those who attempt to commit a crime based on their subjective perceptions). See also summary of subjectivists' arguments in Fletcher, supra note 152, at 54-55.
104 Fletcher, supra note 152, at 54 (footnotes omitted).
10. Criminal Attempts Act, 1981, ch. 47, § 1(3) (Eng.).
'" N.Y. Penal Law § 110.10 (McKinney 1987).
107 See, e.g., Enker, supra note 134.
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According to the neo-objectivists, the problem with eliminating
the Legal Impossibility II defense is that it creates the danger of
convicting a defendant on the basis of his beliefs alone. This is
because the acts that a defendant commits in a Legal Impossibility
II case are objectively innocent. For example, Jaffe bought unstolen merchandise and the would-be cocaine seller sold only
sugar. Thus, convictions in these cases can only be sustained on
the basis of what the defendant believed, not what he did. The
neo-objectivists argue that this gives rise to a number of dangers.
First, the elimination of a requirement of objectively guilty behavior vastly enhances the discretion of the prosecutor for bringing
charges, and thereby increases the danger of selective and discriminatory prosecution. Actions that are completely lawful and innocent in an objective sense can now be prosecuted by alleging that
the actor subjectively intended to commit a crime. Of course, a
prosecutor is unlikely to bring such a charge against main-line "respectable" members of society; rather, it is the unpopular and
weaker members of society, so-called "undesirables," who are the
likely targets of such prosecutions.lli 8
In addition, elimination of the requirement that the defendant's

10. See Enker, supra note 134, at 687-90. Also, consider Stanley E. Crawford Jr.'s defense
of the decision in United States v. Oviedo, 525 F.2d 881 (5th Cir. 1976), where the court
refused to convict a defendant who sold a substance he believed to be heroin that turned
out to be a noncontrolled substance. The court found that defendant's actions were objectively innocent, i.e., the selling of a noncontrolled substance, and refused to convict in the
absence of conduct that clearly and unequivocally marked the defendant's criminal intent.
Mr. Crawford defended the court's decision by pointing out that the absence of such a rule
might give rise to selective and discriminatory prosecutions:
Assume, for example, that a package of marijuana-like substance is hidden in a gas
station restroom. Narcotics agents are notified and establish a stake-out. If a welldressed, affluent businessman comes out with the package, and calmly responds to
polite questioning that he was about to turn the package in to the police because he
assumed it was either illegal or lost, then probably that will end the affair. But if a
lower-class black man brings out the package and, upon arrest, angrily or fearfully
stammers that he accidently found it, these circumstances might well justify conviction under the rule established by the Model Penal Code [for conviction of attempts).
The Oviedo threshold would not be crossed, however, for the suspect's objective behavior would be so commonplace that persons not in violation of the law might have
acted in the same fashion. For this reason alone .the test adopted by the Fifth Circuit
is the better course to follow in defining punishable criminal attempts; it does not
permit the weaving of suspicious circumstances and casual comments by a defendan.t
into the whole cloth of liability for a criminal attempt without the support of proof of
objective actions which clearly corroborate his guilt.
Stanley E. Crawford, Jr., 4 Am. J. Crim. L. 317, 333 (1976) (footnote omitted).

HeinOnline -- 12 Va. Tax Rev. 368 1992-1993

1993]

Reflections on United States v. Leona Helmsley

369

action be objectively guilty combined with the resulting shift in
focus to the defendant's beliefs and motives inevitably means that
the jury will be invited, and empowered, to convict solely on the
basis of factors traditionally thought to be suspect: the defendant's
associations, his prior criminal record, his reputation, accomplice
testimony and confessions. 159
At the same time, allowing a conviction where the defendant's
actions are objectively innocent will permit conviction where one of
the most persuasive bases for inferring the requisite mens rea will
be missing, that is, the existence of acts strongly corroborative of a
guilty intent. Thus, the risk of wrongful convictions will be
increased. 160
Finally, the neo-objectivists argue that elimination of a requirement that the defendant's action be objectively guilty, and the
consequent emphasis upon the defendant's motives and intent, will
subtly pervert the relationship between the state and the individual contrary to the basic postulates of a liberal society. When the
Legal Impossibility II defense is in place, the emphasis is upon the
defendant's actions. With the elimination of that defense, the emphasis shifts to the defendant's motives, intent and beliefs. This
shift inevitably produces a corresponding shift in how the prosecutor views and operates his office. When the emphasis is on acts,
the dangerous or harmful act must precede police intervention.
When the emphasis is on an individual's beliefs, the emphasis
shifts from acts to the person. This, in turn, encourages the police
to make a determination of a person's dangerousness first, and
then to "build a case" to convict that person. 161 Critics assert it is
no coincidence that Legal Impossibility II cases frequently involve
"sting" operations. Neo-objectivists argue that this shift in emphasis jeopardizes the security of the sphere for private autonomy
(e.g., beliefs, intentions, private conve.rsations) that is the hallmark
of a liberal society. They would maintain the Legal Impossibility II
defense, or some variant of it, to assure that some objective manifes'tation of criminality must precede official intervention into this
realm of private autonomy: "[T]houghts, intentions and feelings
occur in the private sphere. The state needs some ground, some

••• Enker, supra note 134, at 690.
• 60 Id. at 679-80.
• 6. See, e.g., Spjut, supra note 123, at 276-78.
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warrant, for probing into this realm of citizens' autonomy."162
The neo-objectivists propose several solutions to these problems.
Some, like Professor Enker 163 and the Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit,164 would retain the Legal Impossibility II defense in
its full vigor. Others, like Professors Hughes and Fletcher, and the
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, would modify the Legal Impossibility II defense by permitting conviction only where there is
unambiguous evidence showing a commitment to perpetrate an unlawful act. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in United
States v. Oviedo l6 r> thus adopted the following test:
"[W]e demand that in order for a defendant to be guilty of a criminal attempt, the objective acts performed, without any reliance on
the accompanying mens rea, mark the defendant's conduct as
criminal in nature. The acts should be unique rather than so commonplace that they are engaged in by persons not in violation of
the law."168

Professor Hughes proposes a similar test which insists that "an
attempt must be understood as including a reference to trying to
achieve the actus reus of the complete crime in some way which is
apparent on the face of the actus reus of the attempt."167 Thus,
Professor Hughes would convict only where the "conduct by the
accused conjures up for us" the completed crime that he is charged
,., Fletcher, supra 152, at 64-65.
Id. at 710.
,•• United States v. Berrigan, 482 F.2d 171 (3d Cir. 1973). Although the court based its
decision to retain the common law defense of legal impossibility on the absence of any statutory provision to the contrary, id. at 185-86, the court was clearly influenced by its concern
with the underlying policy considerations; as revealed by the following comment:
Indeed, though it is not before us, we' do evidence some concern that the proposed
changes in federal criminal code seem to fashion a new crime where the critical element to be proved is mens rea simpliciter. We detect the total lack of objective guidelines in the presentation of such proof or a defense. While mens rea is certainly
within one's control it is not subject to direct proof; it is proved by circumstantial
evidence only. More important, it is not subject to direct refutation. It is the subject
of inference and speculation. We perceive the danger of potential abuse where the
circumstances admit to very little objective measurement. More important, we are
unwilling as a court to legislate by judicial fiat a crime consistent only with thought
processes, as this is reminiscent of the German law of the Nazi period ....
Id. at 189 n.39.
,•• 525 F.2d 881 (5th Cir. 1976).
,•• Id. at 885.
,.7 Hughes, supra note 125, at 1026 (second emphases added).

I.'
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with having attempted. 168 Professor Fletcher would require as a
precondition for trying a defendant for attempt that his acts manifest on their face the defendant's dangerousness. 169
The subjectivists have rejoinders to these arguments. The Reporters for the Model Penal Code downplay the practical significance of the concerns raised by the objectivists: "[I]t should first
be noted how unlikely it is that persons will be prosecuted on the
basis of admissions alone; the person who has behaved in a wholly
innocuous way is not a probable subject of criminal proceedings.
So, the issue posed ... is more theoretical than practical."17o Fur-'
ther, they argue that requiring the defendant's behavior in and of
itself to manifest a commitment to break the law would free defendants where the probative indications of guilt arising from both
their acts and admissions are substantial, but "whose behavior"
alone arguably would not be strongly corroborative of that purpose."I71 Moreover, subjectivists argue that the various "equivocality" tests proposed thus far are totally unworkable because their
criteria are so vague and amorphous. 172 For example, Professor
Hughes would acquit the defendant unless his behavior in and of
itself "conjure[d] up for us" or "evoke[d] the image" of the completed crime which the defendant is charged with attempting,17a
But how does one determine the salient features that will "conjure
up for us" or "evoke the image" of a successfully completed crime?
For example, consider the old chestnut of the defendant who fires
a gun at a stump believing it to be his lifelong enemy.174 Does
Hughes's "model of success" of a murder require the presence of
the victim, or is it sufficient that the defendant used deadly
force?1711

Id. at 1030.
10. Fletcher, supra note 152, at 64.
170 Model Penal Code § 5.01 commentary at 319-20 (Proposed Official Draft 1962).
171 Id. at 320.
17. Fletcher, supra note 152, at 64. He states "contemporary subjectivist writers, such as
Glanville Williams, have nothing but contempt for the standard of equivocality. They dismiss it as 'unworkable' ...." Id.
17' Hughes, supra note 125, at 1030.
17. This was a hypothetical case posed by Baron Bramwell in R. v. McPherson, 169 Eng.
Rep. 975 (1857).
17. See Spjut, supra note 123, at 266.
10.
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A CRITIQUE OF THE EXISITING No-TAX-DuE DEFENSE AND A
PROPOSAL FOR REFORM

Having reviewed both the background of section 7201, its terms,
its relationship to other tax crimes, its legislative history, and the
impossibility defense in the law of attempt, this Article will now
try to draw these seemingly disparate strands together to formulate a solution to the issues posed by the No-Tax-Due defense.

A.

Inadequacy of Statutory Langu:age and Legislative History
In Determining Correctness of the No-Tax-Due Defense

As discussed earlier in this article,176 it is clear that neither the
language of section 7201 nor its legislative history can conclusively
determine the correctness of the No-Tax-Due defense. Section
7201 is written in broad general language susceptible to varying
interpretations. The section proscribes any attempt to "evade or
defeat any tax imposed by this title," but leaves undefined the
phrase "any tax imposed by this title." The phrase may reasonably
be construed to have any of three meanings: the actual dollar
amount of tax the taxpayer properly owes; any type of tax imposed
by Title 26; or, in the case of the income tax, the tax on each of the
components making up taxable income. The applicability and
scope of the No-Tax-Due defense turns on the definition of this
phrase.
Recall the hypothetical discussed in connection with the O'Brien
case: T had wages of $10,000, interest of $2000 and qualified for a
moving expense deduction of $2000. Thus, T's correct taxable income was $10,000. Assuming a flat tax rate of 50% and disregarding exemptions, T's tax liability was $5000. T, with intent to defraud, omitted the $2000 of interest income, but also failed to
claim the $2000 of moving expenses. Thus T, by inadvertence, reported the correct amount of his taxable income and paid the correct amount of his tax liability.177
If the phrase "any tax imposed by this title" means the actual
dollar amount of the tax owed, it is difficult to say in a case like
the above hypothetical that the taxpayer has "attempt[ed] ... to
evade or defeat" (i.e., underpay) the tax "imposed by this title,"

17.
177

See supra text accompanying part I1LC.
See supra text accompanying notes 71-72.
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since T has reported and paid the full amount of the tax owed. T
has simply done nothing to evade or defeat the amount of tax he
actually owes.
On the other hand if the phrase "a,ny tax imposed by this title"
is construed more broadly to mean "any" of the types of tax imposed by Title 26, then one can say with linguistic correctness that
a defendant who omitted an item of taxable income with the intent
to underpay his tax liability has tried, or "attempt[ed]" to "defeat" a "tax imposed by this title," namely the income tax. This
would still be true if the attempt fails and no tax deficiency occurs
because, as in the above hypothetical, an overlooked deduction offsets the amount of the unreported income. Lack of success is no
defense to a charge of attempt.
Likewise, if a person's tax liability is 'conceived of, not as a single, indivisible amount, but as the sum of separate taxes on each of
the different components making up his taxable income, one again
could argue that a person who intentionally omits an item of income, such as interest, has "attempt[ed]" to "defeat" the "tax" on
that item. This would remain true even if it turns out that the
taxpayer inadvertently failed to claim a deduction he was entitled
to; the omission does not negate the attempted evasion of another
component of his taxable income.
While the first interpretation supports the No-Tax-Due defense,
these latter two constructions invalidate it. And there is no way
that linguistic analysis can decide among the constructions. Likewise, the statute's legislative history is inconclusive: although nothing in this history explicitly proves that Congress intended to impose as a requirement for conviction that there be a tax deficiency,
nothing rules it out. 178 As in so many matters of this nature, the
answer must ultimately be found in the policies underlying the
statute and the criminal justice system.
B.

The Case for Abolishing the No-Tax-Due Defense

One problem with the present No-Tax-Due defense is revealed
by the following case: Taxpayers A and B, each having the same
culpable intent to underpay his or her rightful income tax liability,
omit a significant portion of their respective incomes from their
,

178

I

See discussion supra part III.B.
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tax returns. A has a deduction that more than offsets his unreported income; however, he fails to claim it because he is unaware
of its existence. B is entitled to no such deduction. Under the current state of the law, B would be convicted of attempted income
tax evasion while A would be freed under the No-Tax-Due defense.
To convict B while acquitting A when both are equally culpable
of attempting to underpay their tax liability offends our sense of
justice and fair play, and a construction of the statute that produces that result should be avoided. 179 Moreover, insofar as 'one of
the purposes of criminal statutes is to express the moral outrage of
the community towards the proscribed behavior/so a construction
of the statute that acquits taxpayers for reasons unrelated to their
moral culpability undermines and trivializes the moral force of the
law. Furthermore, it is probable that the No-Tax-Due defense undermines the deterrent force of the law. To the extent the public
perceives that morally guilty persons are acquitted for reasons unrelated to their moral guilt, the impression grows that one has a
good chance of escaping punishment with creative lawyering.
Moreover, people who seek to cheat on their taxes and take substantial steps toward that end have sufficiently manifested their
propensity to violate the law and their "dangerousness" to society
so as to justify societal action against them. 18l Although the taxpayer's intent to cheat the government in the present year may
have been frustrated by the existence of an undiscovered and
therefore unclaimed offsetting deduction, it is likely that such a
person will try again and perhaps succeed.
The fact that a defendant in a No-Tax-Due case has paid the
full amount of the taxes, and thus caused no immediate harm,
should have no bearing on his treatment under section 7201. While
many statutes do grade the seriousness of a crime on the degree of
harm perpetrated, Congress explicitly rejected this approach in the
17. See Herbert Wechsler, William Kenneth Jones and Harold L. Korn, The Treatment of
Inchoate Crimes in the Model Penal Code of the American Law Institute: Attempt, Solicitation, and Conspiracy, 61 Colum. L. Rev. 571, 572-73 (1961) ("[E]xculpating the actor [because of a fortuity] would involve inequality of treatment that would shock the common
sense of justice.").
180 Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Aims of the Criminal Law, 23 Law & Contemp. Probs. 401,
405 (Criminal statutes constitute "a formal and solemn pronouncement of the moral condemnation of the community.").
,., See Model Penal Code § 5.01 commentary at 308-09, 315-16 (Proposed Official Draft
1962).
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case of income tax evasion. As the Supreme Court has noted, income tax evasion is "complete in its most serious form when the
attempt is complete, and nothing is added to its criminality by
success or consummation."l82
While these reasons for eliminating the No-Tax-Due defense,
which echo the arguments advanced by the subjectivists in the
controversy over the impossibility defense, argue forcefully for the
complete abolition of the No-Tax-Due defense, the counter arguments of the neo-objectivists raise a cautionary signal. The following section of this article examines each of the hypothetical cases
posed in Part II, and attempts to determine the propriety of
conviction.

C.

Applying the Lessons of the Impossibility Defense

In the Unreported Gift hypothetical (case 1), the taxpayer, D,
erroneously believing gifts to be a component of taxable income,
willfully omits a gift from income in an attempt to defraud the
government. Note the similarity between this case and the Legal
Impossibility I cases involving "illusory crimes." In those cases, the
defendants believed they were committing unlawful acts, but in
fact they did not commit any criminal act. While both the Legal
Impossibility I defense and the No-Tax-Due defense would produce the same result in the Unreported Gift case, the question of
whether this result represents sound public policy remains.
The usual justification proffered for this result is that conviction
would offend the principle of legality: it would make something an
offense which the legislature has chosen not to make an offense. 183
At best, this limited conception of "legality" constitutes only a
partial justification.
The principle of legality itself seems. to rest on two underlying
concerns: that citizens should have fair and adequate notice of
what actions may result in criminal liability;184 and that in a democracy, it is the business of the legislature, and not the judiciary
to determine criminality.185
... Spies v. United States, 317 U.S. 492,498-99 (1942).
183 Williams, supra note 128, at 633-634.
'.4 Enker, supra note 134, at 670 (principle of legality ensures that "the citizen will receive advance guidance as to what conduct is forbidden.")
I •• Fletcher, supra note 152, at 55 ("[L)egislative supremacy is all that is required by the
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The insufficiency of this limited conception of "legality" as a
policy justification for the result in the "imaginary crime" cases is
exposed by asking whether the problem could be cured in these
instances if the legislature passed a statute making it a criminal
offense for a person to do any act which he believed to be unlawful. 188 If one's objection to conviction in these cases is a concern
that the legislature's function not be usurped by the judiciary,
then that objection should be overcome by the legislature's express
direction to convict a defendant who commits acts he believes to
be unlawful. 187 Moreover, the lack of adequate notice to the potential lawbreaker should not be a serious concern under such a statute. Since a defendant could be convicted under such a statute
only where he believed his acts to be unlawful, he would necessarily have realized before he embarked on his course of conduct that
it entailed potential criminal liability.
Returning to the Unreported Gift case, the objection that conviction in this case violates the principle of legality can be cured
simply by amending the statute to provide for conviction of anyone
who believes he is defrauding the government of tax revenue.
Thus, the belief that conviction is inappropriate in these cases,
must ultimately be based on broader grounds than the principle of
legality, or alternatively, the concept of legality must expanded to
reflect broader concerns than those set out above.
The broader concerns at issue in this case are those raised by the
neo-objectivists in their opposition to the elimination of the Legal
Impossibility II defense: the concern that such an action will unwisely increase the scope of prosecutorial discretion and enhance
the danger that the law will be applied in a discriminatory fashion;
the danger that such an action would increase reliance upon unreliable and suspect evidence; and finally, the concern that by eliminating the requirement that the defendants' behavior· must in
some sense be objectively guilty, one has eliminated one of the
most persuasive reasons for inferring the existence of the requisite
mens rea. Whatever the validity of such concerns elsewhere, the
danger of discriminatory and unjust prosecutions in the case of·
maxim nulla poena sine lege.")
188 See Fletcher, supra note 152, at 59 ("There is no reason why criminal codes should not
include a catchall provision covering any intent to violate the law.")
181 Fletcher, supra note 152, at 55.
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federal tax crimes is real and substantial.
First, there is a vast potential for abuse simply because everyone
is subject, or can be made subject, to the income tax. 188 If a prosecutor desires to move against an unpopular group or a political enemy, the criminal tax laws offer a handy weapon. 18S Secondly, the
tax laws typically are not clear and precise but subject to many
different, good faith interpretations. This means that a prosecutor
may be able to make out a plausible case of income tax evasion
even where the defendant acted in complete innocence. ISO More
significantly, there is a well-established tradition in this country,
Even a so-called tax exempt organization may be subject to pressure under the tax
laws. The Service may attempt to revoke the organization's tax-exempt status, in which case
contributions they receive will no longer be deductible to the donors and the organization's
income may be subject to tax. I.R.C. §§ 170, 501. See discussion infra note 204 and accompanying text on attempt of the Service to tax income of the Communist Party. The Service
may assert that part of the organization's income is taxable as "unrelated business taxable
income." I.R.C. §§ 511-514. If the organization is a public charity, the Service may attempt
. to impose a 25 percent penalty for excess lobbying expenditures, I.R.C. § 4911, and if it is a
"private foundation," the Service may attempt to impose punitive excise taxes on the foundation and its manager for engaging in certain prohibited transactions. I.R.C. §§ 4941-4963.
••• Tax and Vietnam War protesters have frequently asserted that they are victims of
selective prosecution for tax crimes. The courts have unanimously rejected such claims. See
Bennett L. Gershman, Prosectorial Misconduct § 4.3(d)(5)(B) (1991). For example, in
United States v. Amon, 669 F.2d 1351, 1356 (10th Cir. 1981), cert. den., 459 U.S. 825 (1982),
the court rejected defendant's claim of unconstitutional selective prosecution despite the
trial court's finding that he was "selected for prosecution because he is an active and outspoken protestor." Id. at 1356.
180 The Supreme Court has construed the word "willfully," as used in the criminal tax
laws, to mean that defendant must intentionally violate a known duty to be convicted. The
Court adopted this construction-which is contrary to the general rule that ignorance of the
law is no defense-because in "our complex tax system, uncertainty often arises even among
taxpayers who earnestly wish to follow the law" and "[ilt is not the purpose of the law to
penalize frank difference of opinion or innocent errors made despite the exercise of reasonable care." United States v. Bishop, 412 U.S. 346, 360-361 (1973), (quoting Spies v. United
States, 317 U.S. 492, 496 (1943». In Cheek v. United States, 498 U.S. 192, 604 (1991), the
Supreme Court held that a good-faith misunderstanding of the law, no matter how unreasonable, negates willfulness. See generally Mark D. Yochum, Ignorance of the Law is no
Excuse Except for Tax Crimes, 27 Duq. L. Rev. 221 (1989).
This construction of the criminal tax provisions may provide some protection against conviction of those whose good-faith interpretation of the law differs from that of the government, but, of course, it offers little protection against prosecution by an overzealous or politically motivated prosecutor. See United States v. Regan, 937 F.2d 823 (2d Cir.), opinion
amended 946 F.2d 188 (2d Cir. 1991) (taxpayer prosecuted for tax evasion despite testimony
that he took questioned deduction in reliance on a report of the Tax Section of the Association of the Bar of the City of New York, correspondence from his accountants, and his own
study of the relevant section).
.
I ••
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dating back at least to the Al Capone case,191 of using the criminal
tax laws for purposes extraneous to that of protecting revenue. Today, criminal tax laws are routinely used to convict drug dealers,
perpetrators of savings and loan bank fraud and Defense Department procurement fraud, and members of organized crime. One recent study concluded that from 1978 to 1988, the percentage of all
criminal tax cases directed against persons who derived income
from illegal sources or activities increased from 15% to over 40%,
almost a three-fold increase. 192 This use of the tax law has been
vigorously debated, with critics charging that it perverts the basic
purpose of the tax laws and undermines the deterrent impact of
convictions on the average citizen. 193 The most dangerous aspect of
this use of the criminal tax laws is that it puts one on a slippery
slope. Once we rationalize the use of the tax laws as a legitimate
mechanism to "get" bad persons, such as mobsters, it becomes that
much easier to rationalize their use against persons because of unpopular beliefs or activities. 194
Finally, there appear to be numerous well-documented cases of
the tax laws being used in all administrations against political enemies and as a means of curbing political dissent, ranging from
President Roosevelt's instigation of income tax audits against Rep,., United States v. Capone, 56 F.2d 927 (7th Cir.), cert. den., 286 U.S. 553 (1932). See
Elmer L. Irey & William J. Slocum, The Tax Dodgers 25-65 (1948).
. .2 Jeffrey A. Dubin, Michael A. Graetz and Louis L. Wilde, The Changing Face of Tax
Enforcement, 1978-1988, 43 Tax Law. 893, 910 (1990).
,•• A 1991 report of a subcommittee of the Tax Section of the American Bar Association,
which was endorsed by eight former Internal Revenue Commissioners, contends that the
shift toward specific enforcement cases undermines the deterrent effect of the criminal tax
law on the average citizen:
These research results indicate that the mass of law-abiding taxpayers can, and do,
distinguish themselves from "special" enforcement targets-obviously, most taxpayers are not drug dealers, organized crime figures or other notorious criminals, nor do
they identify with such offenders. Accordingly, a realization by the public that "general" criminal tax enforcement-against person like themselves-is diminishing could
indeed reduce overall compliance.
SubComm. on Criminal Tax Policy, Comm. on Civil and Criminal Tax Penalties, Section of
Taxation, Am. Bar Ass'n, Redirecting Criminal Tax Enforcement to Improve Voluntary
Compliance, reprinted in Tax Notes Today, Aug. 23, 1991.
... For an illuminating discussion of this issue in the context of the Kennedy Administration's decision to use the criminal tax laws to prosecute organized crime members, see Victor
S. Navasky, Kennedy Justice 63-68 (1971). Howard Glickstein, who was then in the Civil
Rights Division of the Justice Department, said of this practice: "This time it's the Mafiosi,
but the next time it could be the Black Panthers or Goldwater supporters." Id. at 59.
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resentatives Hamilton Fish 195 and Huey Long 196 to the politicallymotivated income tax audits of Lawrence O'Brien and others on
President Nixon's "enemies list."197
Other alleged misuse of the tax law to curb political dissent and
punish political enemies include:
(1) The unsuccessful effort of the Roosevelt Administration to
indict Andrew Mellon, Secretary of the Treasury in Republican administrations from 1921 to 1932, for income tax evasion;198
(2) An IRS investigation of Paul Robeson during the Roosevelt
Administration focusing on his alleged communist activities;199
(3) A Treasury Department investigation of a transaction involving Frank Gannett, vice chairman of the Republican National
Committee and a conservative newspaper publisher critical of the
Roosevelt Administration, which was triggered by a note from Eleanor Roosevelt to the Secretary of the Treasury;200
(4) Leaks by the Nixon White House of unfavorable information
about George Wallace derived from an IRS investigation to newspaper columnist Jack Anderson to harm Wallace in his gubernatorial primary fight;201

... Ted Morgan, FDR: A Biography 554 (1985) ("FDR wanted to have [Fish] indicted for
violating the statute that barred a private citizen from conducting foreign affairs but
Cordell Hull advised against it. So FDR asked [Secretary of the Treasury] Morgenthau to
study his tax returns and get something on him.").
1•• David Burnham, A Law Unto Itself: The IRS And the Abuse of Power 231-35 (Vintage
Books 1991) (1989).
1.7 Id. at 249-5l.
1•• Id. at 229-30. Burnham describes the attempt to prosecute Mellon as "[p]robably the
single most brazen display of the Roosevelt administration's willingness to use the tax
agency for political purposes." Id. at 229. The investigation proceeded despite the misgivings of Elmer L. Irey, director of the predecessor of the Criminal Investigation Division, and
a Justice Department memorandum that found that the charges that the Roosevelt Administration wanted to lodge against Mellon were either invalid or could not be. proved. Id. The
Administration announced on March 11, 1934, that it would seek criminal tax evasion
charges against Mellon, but the grand jury refused to indict him. Id. at 229-30. In a subsequent civil action, the Government alleged that Mellon owed a tax deficiency $2,059,507.49
and sought to recover, in addition to taxes and interest, a 50% fraud penalty. The Board of
Tax Appeals held against the Government on the fraud issue and most of the other issues.
A.W. Mellon v. Commissioner, 36 B.T.A. 977, acq. on fraud issue, 1938-1 C.B. 20 (1937).
According to Burnham, the Board found Mellon owed $485,809-about one-sixth of what
the Government had sought to recover in the civil proceeding. Burnham, supra note 196, at
230.
1•• Burnham, supra note 196, at 235-36.
2.0 Id. at 236-38.
2.1 Id. at 250.
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(5) An unsuccessful effort by the Nixon White House to have the

IRS investigate persons making contributions to the campaign of
the Democratic presidential candidate George McGovern;~02
(6) Revocation without a hearing of the tax-exempt status of a
number of left-wing groups for being "subversive organizations"
during the Truman Administration, although the statute did not
define "subversive organization" or make it a basis for denial of
tax-exempt status;203
(7) Seizure of all known assets of the Communist Party and attempts to collect income taxes from it beginning in the Eisenhower
Administration, on the ground that it was not a tax-exempt organization, even though no similar action was taken against the Democratic or Republican Parties;204
(8) Alleged IRS harassment of the National Council of Churches
during the Johnson and Nixon Administrations purportedly because of its liberal civil rights activities and later because of its
anti-Vietnam War activities;205
(9) Audits instigated by the Kennedy Administration against
right-wing organizations (e.g., H. L. Hunt's Life-Line Foundation
and Dr. Fred Schwartz's· Christian Anti-Communist Crusade)
under a specially-instituted Ideological Organizations Audit
Program. 206
It is beyond the scope of this Article to assess the degree to
which the tax laws have been used for political and other improper
purposes. Great potential for abuse exists in the criminal tax laws,
and one would not, absent very compelling reasons, expand the
scope of prosecutorial discretion or soften the requirements for
conviction.
For these reasons, prosecutions should not be permitted where a
taxpayer files a correct return _on the theory that the taxpayer believed he was defrauding the government. Thus, there should be no
prosecution in the Unreported Gift case. To permit prosecution in
such a case would greatly expand the number of potential prosecuId. at 251-52.
Id. at 261-62.
... Id. at 262-63. In Communist Party of the U.S.A. v. Commissioner, 373 F.2d 682 (D.C.
Cir. 1967), the court directed the Tax Court to consider the Party's claim that it had been
singled out from other political parties for discriminatory treatment.
'00 Burnham, supra note 196, at 264-67.
OOG Id. at 270-73.
000
003
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tions and would correspondingly increase the prosecutor's discretion. But it is not only the increased prosecutorial discretion that
is objectionable, it is also the type of evidence that would necessarily be used in such a prosecution. Since the actions of the defendant were not "objectively unlawful," the prosecution, in attempting
to demonstrate the defendant's belief that his actions were illegal,
would have to rely upon types of evidence commonly believed suspect, such as statements made by confederates and past criminal
history. It is also objectionable that the most persuasive evidence
for inferring the requisite mens rea, objectively guilty behavior, is
absent. Thus, the risk of wrongful convictions is increased. It is for
these pragmatic reasons, not the absence of a tax deficiency, that
this type of prosecution should not be permitted.
These dangers also exist in the Skimmed Funds case (case 4)
and the Unrecognized Picasso case (case 5). These cases would
most likely be classified as Legal Impossibility II cases, rather than
Legal Impossibility I cases,207 but they contain the same salient
feature as the Unreported Gift case: the defendant did not engage
in any "objectively guilty" behavior.
Although the defendant in the Skimmed Funds case believed he
was unlawfully omitting the skimmed funds from his income, objectively the defendant was simply omitting nontaxable -returns of
capital. Although the defendant in the Unrecognized Picasso case
believed he had fraudulently overvalued the painting he gave to
charity, objectively he merely claimed an insufficient deduction for
his donation. Since these taxpayers did not engage in any objectively guilty behavior, the prosecution would be based on the defendant's beliefs rather than his actions, and this would pose ex-

.07 The Unrecognized Picasso case is a Legal Impossibility II case rather than a Legal
Impossibility I case, since the taxpayer's mistake was one of fact (the true value of the
painting) rather than any misapprehension about the law on the deductibility of charitable
donations. Classification of the Skimmed Funds case is more problematic, since the facts in
the hypothetical provide insufficient information as to the nature of D's mistake. His mistake may have been one of fact (Le., he did not know that the corporation lacked "earnings
and profits" at the time of his "skimming"), or one of law (i.e., he did not know that distributions from a corporation without "earnings and profits" were treated under the law as
nontaxable returns of capital). Professor Hughes has suggested that under the orthodox approach, this type of case should be treated as one of legal impossibility (and thus the defendant should be acquitted) "uniess the prosecution is able to show that the accused was
acting under a mistake of fact which, if the facts had been as he supposed them to be, would
constitute mens rea for the completed crime." Hughes, supra note 125, at 1022.
.
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actly the same dangers as in the Unreported Gift case. For these
reasons, conviction should not be permitted in these two cases.
However, these concerns do not apply to either the Fictitious
Dependent case (case 2) or the Hotel Baroness.case (case 3). Unlike the Unreported Gift case and the Unrecognized Picasso case,
the defendants in these cases engaged in objectively wrongful behavior. The actus reus of the crime in this type of case, claiming a
deduction one is not entitled to, or omitting taxable income, is exactly the same as in the ordinary income tax evasion case. Therefore, allowing conviction in this type of case would not significantly
enlarge the prosecutor's discretion; he would still be restricted to
prosecuting those cases where the actus reus was of the same nature as any other income tax evasion case. And since the prosecution would attempt to prove objectively guilty behavior, as well as
the requisite mens rea, there would not be an excessive focus on
the defendant's beliefs and motives and the consequent overreliance upon forms of evidence generally believed to be unreliable.
As discussed earlier, the purposes of the criminal tax law argue
strongly for permitting conviction in this type of case. 208 Section
7201, the income tax evasion statute, constitutes the "capstone" of
the criminal tax system and represents the harshest moral condemnation found in the tax law. Acquitting a person who intentionally set out to defraud the government of his tax merely because of an unrelated and unknown offset offends the moral
indignation reflected in the statute. In addition, it would result in
people who were equally culpable receiving unequal treatment.
Moreover, by creating the impression that conviction for income
tax evasion can be avoided by "technicalities," it would subtly undermine the deterrent effect of the criminal tax law. For these reasons, the defendants in both the Fictitious Dependant and Hotel
Baroness cases should be convicted.
In the Ten-Percenter hypothetical (case 6) the defendant falsely
reported another's winnings as his own in order to enable the true
winner to evade income tax liability. In United States v. Petti, the
case on which this hypothetical was based, the "ten percenter" was
acquitted of attempted income tax evasion because there was no
proof that the true winner had a tax deficiency.209 Under the com-

208
208

See discussion supra part V.B.
448 F.2d 1257 (3d Cir. 1971).
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mon law defense of impossibility this case could not be characterized as a form of legal impossibility because the scheme, had it not
been interrupted, would have actually resulted in a crime, namely,
income tax evasion. No essential element of the definition of the
substantive crime is missing; this is simply a case of a frustrated
attempt. The only legal issue therefore, is wheth~r the defendant's
actions have gone beyond "mere preparation."210 In the hypothetical, the defendant's actions had clearly gone beyond mere preparation; indeed, he had completed all the intended acts. 2l1
Moreover, there is no policy reason why the defendant in the
Ten-Percenter hypothetical should not be convicted. Since the tenpercenter engaged in objectively guilty behavior, the dangers of
convicting on belief alone do not exist. The ten-percenter should
be convicted of attempted income tax evasion.
D.

A Proposed Revision of the No-Tax-Due Defense
I

The following represents an attempt to synthesize and encapsulate the principles developed in the foregoing discussion:
No defendant shall be convicted 0'£ attempted income tax evasion
under section 7201 where there is no tax deficiency, unless he
either:
(a) Claims or attempts to claim (or enables or attempts to enable
another to claim) a deduction or a credit212 that is not properly

11. For a discussion of the distinction in the case law between "preparation" and "attempt," see Model Penal Code § 5.01 commentary at 321-29 (Proposed Official Draft 1962);
Lafave & Scott, supra note 119, §6.2(d).
211 See Model Penal Code § 5.01 commentary at 321 (Proposed Official Draft 1962)
("[T)here is general agreement that when the actor has done all that he believes to be necessary to commit the offense in question, he has committed an attempt."). Support for convicting the ten-percenter, based upon analogy to the common law of attempt, may also be
found in the doctrine that "involuntary abandonment" of an attempt (e.g., where the defendant abandons the attempt because he believes the police have discovered his plans) is
not a defense. See Lafave & Scott, supra note 119, § 6.3, at 520. In the Ten-Percenter case,
no tax evasion occurred because the true winner "involuntarily abandoned" his plan, that is,
he accurately reported his winnings because he realized the authorities knew he was the true
winner.
212 A "deduction" is subtracted from "gross income" to determine "taxable income."
I.R.C. § 63(a). The taxpayer's tax liability is computed on his taxable income. I.R.C. § l.
"Credits" are subtracted directly from the taxpayer's computed tax liability in determining
the amount the taxpayer owes the government. Examples of "credits" include the credit for
dependent care expenses (I.R.C. § 21), the foreign tax credit (I.R.C. § 27), and the general
business credit (I.R.C. § 38).
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allowable; or
(b) Omits or attempts to omit (or enables or attempts to enable
another to omit) an item of income that is properly reportable.
Under this formulation, the defendants in the Unreported Gift
case, the Skimmed Funds case and the Unrecognized Picasso case
would be acquitted because in none of these cases had reportable
income been omitted or an improper deduction claimed. However,
convictions would be permitted in both the Fictitious Dependent
case, because an improper deduction had been claimed, 'and the
Hotel Baroness case, because reportable income had been omitted.
The fact that the resulting tax deficiency had been eliminated by
an unrelated deduction or credit would not be a defense. Finally,
conviction would be permitted in the Ten-Percenter case, since the
defendant attempted to enable another to omit income that was
properly reportable.

VI.
A.

ISSUES RAISED

BY

THE REVISED No-TAX-DuE DEFENSE

Proper Placement Within the Criminal Tax Law Scheme

In many, possibly most, of the cases where the revised No-TaxDue defense would alter existing law to permit conviction for attempted income tax evasion under section 7201, the defendant
could also be convicted of the lesser, and more leniently treated,
felony of filing a false return or statement under section 7206(1).
For example, in the Hotel Baroness case, the defendant would be
guilty under section 7206(1) of fraudulently filing a false return,
whether or not she was guilty under section 7201, since she willfully filed a false return that omitted a material item of income. 213
us Likewise, the taxpayer in the Fictitious Dependent case' would have been guilty of
violating § 7206(1), since he filed a false tax return claiming an exemption for a nonexistent
dependent.
In the Ten-Percenter case, the ten-percenter had nothing to do with the filing of the true
winner's tax return, but he did provide false information to the racetrack, which it needed
to prepare Treasury Department Form 1099, an information "return" that the racetrack is
required to file with the Service pursuant to LR.C. § 6041(a). In United States v. Cohen, 617
F.2d 56 (4th Cir. 1980), the court found a ten-percenter who had filled in a Form 1099
falsely listing himself as the winner guilty of violating § 7206(2), that is, of assisting in the
preparation of a false return (i.e., the Form 1099).
However, consider the following variation of the Hotel Baroness case: E, an employee of
D, causes the preparation'of an invoice falsely showing work performed at her palatial home
(i.e., installation of a swimming pool) as having been performed for one of her hotel corpora-
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Since conviction may occur in any case, albeit under a different
section, we must consider whether this type of case is more appropriately punishable under section 7201, imposing a maximum sentence of five years, or section 7206(1), imposing a maximum sen. tence of three years. 214
Under section 7206(1), the only burden on the government is to
prove that the defendant willfully filed a return or statement that
he believed to be materially false; neither intent to defraud nor a
tax deficiency is a necessary element of this crime. 215 Relatively
innocent behavior can therefore be caught by this offense. For example, in United States v. Greenberg,216 the taxpayer reported
part of his income as having been earned by his wife on their joint
return so she could obtain credit. 217 The Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit affirmed his conviction, even though there was no
finding that he intended to defraud the government of any tax and
the amount of the tax deficiency was de minimis ($48).218 The justification for this seemingly harsh result was that any willfully
false statement, regardless of the taxpayer's motivation for making
it, could impede the Service in carrying out its mission of verifying
the accuracy of tax returns. 219
Contrast this with the type of case where the revised No-TaxDue defense would permit conviction: the hotel owner who, intending to cheat the government of taxes, deliberately fails to report income; the taxpayer who, with intent to defraud the government, deliberately claims an exemption for a nonexistent
dependent. The mens rea in these cases is substantially more egregious than that proscribed by section 7206; it is in fact the mens
rea called for by section 7201. It therefore deserves to be punished
by the tax crime which embodies the harshest moral condemnation

tions. In the hypothetical, D's unclaimed depreciation deductions offset her unreported income so there was no tax deficiency. E could not be convicted under § 7201 since there was
no tax deficiency, United States v. Petti, 448 F.2d 1257 (3d Cir. 1971), and since E had
nothing to do with the filing of any return with the I.R. Service, it is arguable that E cannot
be convicted under § 7206(1) or § 7206(2).
214 I.R.C. §§ 7201, 7206(1).
21. E.g., United States v. Taylor, 574 F.2d 232, 234 (5th Cir. 1978).
218 735 F.2d. 29 (2d Cir. 1984).
217 Id. at 30.
.
218 Id.
. .8 Id. at 31-32.
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of the tax law and imposes the maximum sanction, section 7201. 220
B.

Effect of the Revised No-Tax-Due Defense on the Use of
Collateral Estoppel in Subsequent Civil Tax Cases

Adopting the revised No-Tax-Due defense would create a cleavage in the criminal and civil treatment of certain tax cases. For
example, in the Hotel Baroness case, the revised No-Tax-Due defense would permit criminal conviction of the defendant, even
though she had no civil tax liability since there was no overall tax
deficiency.
After a successful criminal tax prosecution, the government fre21. LR.C. § 7201. The United States Sentencing Guidelines apparently reduce, but do not
eliminate, the significance of whether a defendant is convicted under § 7201 or § 7206 in a
No-Tax-Due case. Under the guidelines, the length of a sentence under § 7201 is based on
the greater of (a) "the total amount of tax that the taxpayer evaded or attempted to evade;"
and (b) the amount of the "tax loss." U.S.S.G. §2T1.1 (Federal Sentencing Guideline Manual). Tax loss is defined, in the case of an individual, as "28 percent of the amount by which
the greater of gross income and taxable income was understated." U.S.S.G. §2T1.3. In the
case of a conviction under § 7206, length of sentence is based on the amount of "tax loss"
(as defined above), and if there is no tax loss, sentence is imposed under the relatively
lenient guideline that applies to an offense level of 6. Id.
Where there is no tax deficiency because the fraudulently omitted income is offset by an
unclaimed deduction (as in the Hotel Baroness case), the sentencing guidelines make it irrelevant whether the defendant is convicted under § 7201 or § 7206. If convicted under §
7206, the guidelines deem there to be a tax loss (that is, 28 percent of the amount by which
gross income was understated) even though there was no tax deficiency. Sentence would
then be based on the amount of this "deemed" tax loss. This also seems to be the basis on
which sentence would be imposed where the defendant is convicted under § 7201.
However, where there is no tax deficiency because the scheme to defraud the government
was stopped (as in the Ten-Percenter case), it matters whether conviction is under § 7206 or
§ 7201. If the defendant is convicted under § 7206(2), he would be sentenced under the
relatively lenient level 6 offense guideline, since there was no "tax loss." U.S.S.G. §2T.1.4. If
the defendant is convicted under § 7201 (as would occur under the revised No-Tax-Due
Defense), the sentence would be based on the amount of tax the defendant "attempted to
evade." Hence the sentence could be long if the amount of tax sought to be evaded were
large.
It also makes a difference whether a defendant is convicted under § 7201 or § 7206 in a
case where the defendant fraudulently claims an improper deduction, but there is no deficiency because there exists an equally large legitimate but unclaimed deduction (as in the
Fictitious Exemption case). If convicted under § 7206, the defendant would be sentenced
under the relatively lenient level 6 offense guideline. This is because there is seemingly no
"tax loss" within the meaning of the sentencing guidelines, as neither gross income nor taxable income was understated. However, if the defendant is convicted under §7201 (as would
occur under the revised No-Tax-Due defense), his sentence would be based on the amount
of tax he "attempted to evade," and the sentence could be substantial if the improperly
claimed deduction were large.
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quently brings civil suit against the defendant for his unpaid taxes
and the imposition of a fraud penalty, and asserts that the tax'payer is collaterally estopped by his prior conviction. Concern has
been expressed that if the elements for criminal conviction and for
civil liability are not identical, the government will be deprived of
collateral estoppel as an enforcement tooP21 This concern appears
ill-founded.
First, the ,effect of the collateral estoppel doctrine under current
law is not as sweeping and all-encompassing as the above concern
suggests. Under the doctrine, there is estoppel only as to those issues which are actually litigated and necessarily determined in the
first litigation. 222 Therefore, although a conviction under section
7201 estops the taxpayer under current law from denying that
, there was an underpayment of tax, it does not estop him from contesting the amount of the underpayment. 223 This result follows
since the government in a tax evasion case need not prove the specific amount of the underpayment, but only that an underpayment
exists. 224 Moreover, it is impossible to tell from a general jury verdict of "guilty" what portions of the government's case on the underpayment it accepted and what portions it rejected, and therefore impossible to determine how much of an underpayment the
jury found.
Adoption of the revised' No-Tax-Due defense would therefore
only marginally limit the utility of collateral estoppel to the gov... Ira L. Tilzer, May IRS Ignore Character of Diverted Funds in Criminal Cases?, 46 J,
Tax'n 308, 310 (1977) ("The distinction draw)] by the Ninth Circuit [between criminal and
civil tax cases) may also tend to undermine the doctrine of collateral estoppel.").
222 Montana v. United States, 440 U.S. 147, 153 (l979); Kotmair v. Commissioner, 86 T.C.
1253, 1262-63 (l986) (stating and applying rule in an income tax context); Restatement
(Second) Of Judgements § 27 (l982).
223 See Note, Collateral Estoppel in Civil Tax Fraud Cases Subsequent to Criminal Conviction, 64 Mich. L. Rev. ,317, 332 (1965) ("While some deficiency must be proved to establish a willful evasion under section 7201, the exact amount need not. Therefore, ... the
exact deficiency ... is still subject to litigation."); Considine v. Commissioner, 68 T.C. 52
(l977) (taxpayer, who was convicted in prior criminal case under § 7206(l) of filing a materially false tax return in that he omitted 1969 capital gain, was not estopped in subsequent
civil case from contesting amount of omitted gain, since determination of exact amount of
omission was not necessarily determined in criminal case); cf. Moore v. United States, 360
F.2d 353 (4th Cir. 1965), cert. den., 385 U.S. 1001 (l967) (government not collaterally estopped from redetermining taxpayer's tax liability in civil proceeding by taxpayer's prior
conviction under section 7201, since determination of exact amount of taxpayer's tax underpayment was not essential to prior judgment).
224 Id.
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ernment, if at all. It is true that under current law a taxpayer convicted under section 7201 is theoretically precluded in a subsequent civil proceeding from presenting evidence that would reduce
his deficiency to zero, since his· conviction conclusively established
that some tax deficiency existed. If the revised No-Tax-Due defense were adopted, a convicted taxpayer would no longer automatically be precluded from contesting the existence of a deficiency since· conviction would be possible in some cases where
there was no deficiency. But since a taxpayer convicted under section 7201 is permitted even under current law to contest the size of
the deficiency in a subsequent civil proceeding, this difference appears more theoretical than real. Furthermore, the taxpayer would
bear the burden of proof on this issue in any subsequent civil
case. 225
Some circuits have placed an additional judicial gloss on section
7201, requiring not only that there be an underpayment of tax but
also that such deficiency be "substantial."226 In these jurisdictions,
a taxpayer who has been convicted under section 7201 is arguably
estopped collaterally from presenting evidence in a subsequent
civil proceeding showing that his deficiency was "insubstantial,"
the theory being that it was actually and necessarily determined in
the criminal proceeding that his deficiency was "substantial."
However, it appears unlikely that this rule places any significant
restriction on the evidence the taxpayer can introduce in the civil
proceeding. The test of what constitutes a "substantial" underpayment of tax is not reducible to an absolute amount or even a specific percentage of either the tax owed or the taxpayer's net or
gross income. As the Second Circuit has stated, the· test "is not
measured in terms of gross or net income nor by any particular
percentage of the tax shown to be due and payable. All the attendant circumstances must be taken into consideration."227 In practice, it appears that no acquittal has ever been directed or any con-

••• Lewis v. Reynolds, 284 U.S. 281 (1932) (taxpayer bears burden of proof in refund actions). See also Tax Ct. R. 142(a) (same in Tax Court actions with limited exceptions) .
••• E.g., United States v. Citron, 783 F.2d 307, 312 (2d Cir. 1986). See also Paul P. Lipton
& Richard A. Petrie, The Substantial Understatement Requirement in Criminal Tax Fraud
Cases, 19 Inst. on Fed. Tax'n 1175 (1961).
227 United States v. Nunan, 236 F.2d 576, 585 (2d Cir. 1956), cert. den., 353 U.S. 912
(1957).
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viction reversed because of the smallness of the tax deficiency.228
Instead, convictions involving very small deficiencies have been
sustained by courts purporting to require a "substantial" underpayment. 229 Given the amorphous nature of the "substantial"
underpayment requirement, it appears unlikely that a court in a
subsequent civil proceeding would place any meaningful restriction
on the evidence the taxpayer could present on the size of his deficiency. Thus, adoption of the revised No-Tax-Due defense would
not significantly reduce the usefulness of the collateral estoppel
doctrine to the government, even in jurisdictions requiring a "substantial" underpayment as a prerequisite for conviction under section 7201.
The principal use of the collateral estoppel doctrine in cases
where the taxpayer has been convicted under section 7201 relates
to the imposition of the civil fraud penalty under section 6663.
Under this section, the government may impose a penalty equal to
75 percent of any portion of an underpayment attributable to
fraud. 230 Unlike most issues in civil tax cases, the government
bears the burden of proving fraud. 231 However, if the taxpayer has
228 Lipton & Petrie, supra note 226, at 1178 (" [T)here is no reported case granting an
acquittal on the ground that the understatement was not substantial."); Henry G. Balter,
Tax Fraud And Evasion ~ 13.03(2) (5th ed. 1983). Balter states,
[s)ince there seems to be no accepted standard of what would be considered not a
substantial deficiency in tax for the purpose of sustaining a motion for acquittal or to
-justify a reversal after conviction, it seems then that the substantiality vel non of the
deficiency must remain a jury question under proper instructions ....
Id.
228 In Janko v. United States, 281 F.2d 156 (8th Cir. 1960), rev'd on other grounds, 366
U.S. 716 (1961), the court sustained the defendant's convictions for 1955 and 1956 even
though the amount evaded for each of those years was only $264, pointing out that "on a
percentage basis the amount involved is large." Id. at 163. Since Janko had reported a tax of
$450 for 1955 and 1956, the amount evaded for those two years was about 37% of his correct
tax liability. The Supreme Court ordered a new trial upon the government's confession of
error. Janko, 366 U.S. 716 (1961). The error was not stated but it apparently did not relate
to the size of the deficiency, since the Court ordered a new trial rather than dismissing the
case.
In United States v. O'Day, 186 F. Supp. 572 (D. Del. 1960), the court refused to grant a
post-trial motion for acquittal where the government only proved a tax liability of $992.50.
Since the taxpayers had reported a tax liability of $218.00, the deficiency was only $774.50.
Id.
230 I.R.C. § 6663(a).
231 I.R.C. § 6663(b); H.R. Rep. No. 247, lOlst Cong., 1st Sess. 1392 ("The committee has
not altered the present-law burden of proof imposed on the IRS in establishing the fraud
initially; the IRS must continue to meet its burden of proof by clear and convincing
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previously been convicted of income tax e.vasion. under section
7201, the taxpayer is collaterally estopped from contesting his
fraud, since proof of a fraudulent intent to underpay taxes is a necessary element for conviction under section 7201. 232 This use of the
collateral estoppel doctrine would be completely unaffected by
adoption of the revised No-Tax-Due defense, since proof of a
fraudulent intent to underpay one's taxes would still be a necessary element for conviction under section 7201.
Finally, whatever incremental burden adoption of the revised
No-Tax-Due defense may place upon the government in civil tax
cases seems justified. The criminal tax law is concerned with vindicating the moral outrage of the community and deterring the proscribed behavior. With respect to these issues, the intent of the
defendant seems paramount. It is for this reason that the revised
No-Tax-Due defense permits conviction where the defendant intended to defraud the government and took substantial steps toward that end, even though an unknown, offsetting deduction frustrated that intent. In contrast, the civil tax law is concerned with
the government getting its due, no more, no less. Thus, the government should not be permitted to use the collateral estoppel doctrine to collect a tax deficiency where none exists.

C.

The Distorting Effect of the Current No-Tax-Due Defense
on the Development of Civil Tax Law Doctrine

A shortcoming of the present No-Tax-Due defense is the pressure it exerts on the courts to stretch and distort civil tax law doctrine to sustain a conviction. Consider the posture in which such
cases typically come before the courts. Substantial evidence, possibly overwhelming evidence, has been presented to a jury showing
that the defendant intended to defraud the government of tax revenue and took substantial steps toward that end. The taxpayer's
lawyer asserts, however, that a conviction cannot stand because an
unrelated deduction eliminates the tax deficiency. Subconsciously,
the court recoils from the thought of the defendant being acquitted
on the basis of a technicality and strains to disallow the deduction
that purportedly offsets the unreported income. In this way,

evidence.").
3.3 Amos v. Commissioner, 43 T.C. 50 (1964), aCfd, 360 F.2d 358 (4th Cir. 1965).
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strained and unjustified constructions of the tax law come about,
and rational development of the law is impeded..
One cannot conclusively demonstrate that this phenomenon occurs, but a review of the decisions suggests it does. In Helmsley,233
Mrs. Helmsley asserted that she owed no additional taxes for the
prosecution years in part because personal property owned by her
husband's partnerships had erroneously been classified as real
property.234 This resulted iIi less depreciation being deducted on
the personal property than the Helmsleys were entitled to under
the applicable ACRS depreciation system. 236 Had proper depreciation deductions been taken, Mrs. Helmsley asserted, there would
have been no tax deficiencies, hence her conviction for income tax
evasion could not stand. 236 As part of its response to this claim, the
Second Circuit asserted that the Helmsleys' improper classification
of personal property as real property, even though erroneous, was
in "effect . . . the selection of an accounting method for personal
property, and it is axiomatic that a taxpayer may not change accounting methods without first obtaining the Commissioner's
consent. "237
In his dissent, Chief Judge Oakes replied that "the change of
method requirements were specifically [made] inapplicable to
ACRS under the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981"238 and, further, that a "correction of a classification of property is not a
change in method of accounting" under the governing Treasury
Regulations. 239
The majority did not address either of these points. 240 Perhaps

3••

941 F.2d 71 (2d Cir. 1991), cert. den., 112 S.Ct. 1162 (1992).

3.. Id. at 83-85.

Id.
Id.
3.7 Id. at 87.
3.8 Id. at 106.
3.9 Id. The Treasury Regulation Chief Judge Oakes referred to, Treas. Reg. § 1.4461(e)(2)(ii)(b), does not specifically state that a correction of a classification of property is
not a change of an accounting method. It does state that "an adjustment in the useful life of
a depreciable asset" is not a change in a method of accounting. This is the provision Chief
Judge Oakes was apparently referring to, since reclassifying the property at issue in Helmsley from real to personal property would shorten the useful life of such property and result
in larger depreciation deductions.
3•• The failure of the majority to address the possible application of Treas. Reg. § 1.446l(e)(2)(ii)(b) is also surprising because Mrs. Helmsley specifically relied upon that provision
in her reply brief. Appellant's Reply Brief at 24, Helmsley (88:0219). The government at-.
3 ••

3.8
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the underlying motivation of the majority is revealed in another
part of the opinion where it wrote "if recalculation is denied to tax
cheats who have selected valid depreciation periods, it must a fortiori be denied to tax cheats like Mrs. Helmsley who further enhanced tax benefits by selecting impermissible periods. "241
As a result of the court's decision in Helmsley, it now appears
that an honest taxpayer who has mistakenly classified personal
property as real property to his detriment will not be able to correct that mistake without the prior approval of the Commissioner.
It is obviously impossible to establish to what extent, if any, the
majority's holding on the "change of accounting method" issue was
influenced by its feeling that Mrs. Helmsley was a "tax cheat," and
it is beyond the scope of this article to determine the substantive
merits of the "change of accounting method" issue. What appears
evident, however, is that a criminal tax case, with all the emotion it
generates, is an inappropriate forum for the dispassionate determination of the extremely complex and technical issues raised by the
tax law. 242 The revised No-Tax-Due defense, by eliminating the retempted to dismiss the relevance of the regulation arguing that it "operates prospectively 'in
the current and future years.' ... Here, Helmsley attempts to change the useful life retroactively." Respondent's Brief at 53-54, Helmsley (88-0219) (citation and footnote omitted).
The government's argument appears weak. Mrs. Helmsley was seeking prospective relief
with respect to the years under consideration (i.e., the prosecution years); she did not seek
adjustment of the useful lives with respect to the pre-prosecution years.
241 Helmsley, 941 F.2d at 87.
'4' See also Willingham v. United States, 289 F.2d 283 (5th Cir.), cert. den., 368 U.S. 828
(1961). In Willingham, the sole shareholder of a corporation was convicted of evading the
taxes of the corporation by setting up fictitious expenses on the books of the company. On
appeal, he claimed the corporation owed no taxes for the prosecution years because the
corporation was entitled to carry forward net operating losses it had incurred prior to its
reorganization in bankruptcy. The court rejected this claim on the ground that the corporation was no longer the same entity that had incurred the losses since there had been a
complete change in ownership and a new corporate structure, the prior shareholders' interests having been wiped out in the bankruptcy proceeding. However, the corporation operated under the same corporate charter as it did before bankruptcy and also carried on the
same business. Id. at 285-287. Theretofore, the courts had denied net operating loss carryforwards only where the corporation was operating under a different charter or carrying
on a different business than the one that incurred the losses. Thus, the decision represented
a substantial expansion of the preexisting law.
The decision was described by one commentator as a "surprising victory for the Government," Robert A. Krantz, Jr., Loss Carryovers in Chapter X Reorganizations, 16 Tax L.
Rev. 359, 412 (1961), and criticized by others as "fatally oversimplif[ying) a most complex
situation." David R. Tillinghast and Stephen D. Gardner, Acquisitive Reorganizations and
Chapters X and XI of the Bankruptcy Act, 26 Tax L. Rev. 663, 714 (1971). Again, it is
impossible to determine whether the court's decision was influenced by the fact that the
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quirement of a tax deficiency in most instances, would reduce the
number of occasions when Courts will be called upon to resolve
such technical issues in the context of a criminal tax case.

D.

The Choice Between Judicial and Legislative Reform

May the revised No-Tax-Due defense advocated in this article
be implemented by a new judicial construction of section 7201, or
is new legislation required?
No sound reason exists why the revised No-Tax-Due defense
should not be applied by the courts prospectively. The fact that
most statements of the existing formulation, including those made
by the Supreme Court, are dicta;243 the lack of any reasoned analysis in the cases that have applied the defense;244 the lack of support for the existing formulation in either the language of the statute or its legislative history;245 and the powerful reasons for
reforming the existing defense 246 all require that the principle of
stare decisis yield to a prospective application of the revised NoTax-Due defense. 247
Undoubtedly, the preferred course of action would be legislative
reform. This would allow a thorough reconsideration of the defense
and would facilitate a clean; decisive, and comprehensive revision
of the defense. In contrast, any judicial revision of the defense is
likely to be halting, drawn out, and piecemeal given the case-bycase nature of the case law process. Nonetheless, one must recognize that it is unlikely that Congress will turn its attention to this
relatively arcane aspect of the criminal tax law. More to the point,
it was the judiciary that created the present No-Tax-Due defense;
it is the judiciary's responsibility to correct its past mistakes.
defendant had attempted to practice tax fraud. But clearly, a criminal tax proceeding is not
the appropriate forum to decide these technical and complex questions.
243 See discussion supra part III.C.
244 See discussion supra part III.C.
. . 6 See discussion supra part liLA-B.
. . 6 See discussion supra part V.B.
247 In James v. United States, 366 U.S. 213 (1961), the Supreme Court overruled its holding in Commissioner v. Wilcox, 327 U.S. 404 (1946), that embezzled funds were not taxable
income but did not apply the overruling retroactively in criminal tax fraud cases. Subsequent cases made it clear that James would be applied prospectively in criminal cases. E.g.,
Nordstrom v. United States, 360 F.2d 734 (8th Cir.), cert. den., 385 U.S. 826 (1966) (taxpayer subject to criminal prosecution where he omitted embezzled funds from return filed
after James although embezzlement occurred before James).
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Retroactive application of the No-Tax-Due defense is more
problematic. The Supreme Court has held that a new or surprising
judicial construction of a criminal statute, that has the effect of
classifying past conduct as criminal which was not punishable
under the then prevailing interpretation of the statute at the time
it occurred, may not be applied retroactively.248 The Court held
that such a retroactive application of the statute violates the defendant's due process right to have fair notice of those actions
which will subject him to criminal penalties. 249
It is unclear whether this principle would preclude retroactive
application of the revised N 0- Tax-Due defense. The Supreme
Court's concern with retroactive application of a new construction
is the lack of warning to the defendant. In most of the cases where
the revised No-Tax-Due defense would alter the existing law by
permitting conviction, the defendants would be hard pressed to
make a tenable claim of justified reliance upon the existing form of
the defense. For example, in the Fictitious Dependent case, the defendant could be convicted under the revised No-Tax-Due case
only if the government proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the
defendant, with intent to cheat the government out of tax revenue,
willfully took a deduction not permitted under the law. The requirements under the revised No-Tax-Due defense that the government prove that the defendant willfully took the deduction in
question, that the deduction was not permitted under existing law,
and that the defendant took the deduction with intent to underpay
his taxes will generally assure that the defendant had fair warning
that his conduct would subject him to criminal penalties. Moreover, the defendant is usually unaware of the facts that would exonerate him under the existing form of the No-Tax-Due defense,
that is, he is usually unaware of the offsetting deduction that eliminates the tax deficiency resulting from his wrongful deduction or
his wrongful omission of income. For example, the taxpayer in the
Fictitious Dependent case was unaware that the loss he treated as
a capital loss qualified as a deductible ordinary loss, and that the
resulting deduction would wipe out the deficiency resulting from
his wrongful claiming of an ex~mption for a fictitious dependent.
'4. Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188 (1977); Bouie v. City of Columbia, 378 U.S. 347
(1964).
•4. Marks, 430 U.S. at 191-92.
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Consequently, the defendant would normally be unable to claim he
relied on the existing form of the defense.
This, however, may not always be true. For example, the court of
appeals suggested in Helmsley that the Helmsleys misclassified
personal property as real property not out of ignorance but out of
shrewd, calculated self-interest. 2Ilo In such cases, the defendant
may be able to make a claim, albeit tenuous, of reliance upon the
existing formulation of the defense. The defendant could claim
that he believed he was immune from a charge of income tax evasion for the year in which he claimed his wrongful deduction, or
omitted his income, because he relied on his ability to offset the
resulting deficiency by the previously unclaimed depreciation deductions he knew he was entitled to.
This problem of retroactivity could possibly be solved by limiting retroactive application of the revised defense only where the
government proves that the defendant was unaware of the offsetting deduction. Drawing this type of distinction, however, seems
both unworkable and inequitable. Requiring the government to
prove, and the jury to decide, that the defendant was unaware of
the offsetting deductions in order to convict will further muddle
the already confusing and complex task of trying income tax evasion cases. Moreover, the distinction seems to cut in the wrong direction. A very cunning and deceitful tax cheat who knows of an
offsetting deduction and keeps it in reserve as a defense escapes
conviction, while the less cunning and sophisticated tax cheat gets
convicted. Concern about even-handed treatment, as well as practical concerns about the administration of justice, dictate that the
revised No-Tax-Due defense not be applied retroactively.
VII.

CONCLUSION

The existing form of the No-Tax-Due defense requires that a defendant be acquitted of attempted income tax evasion even though
he intended to cheat the government of tax and took substantial
steps toward that end where unrelated and unclaimed deductions
eliminate the tax deficiency resulting from his wrongful acts. This
defense is subversive of our sense of justice: defendants who are
••• United States v. Helmsley, 941 F.2d 71, 86 (2d Cir. 1991), cert. den., 112 S.Ct. 1162
(1992).
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equally culpable are treated differently depending on the fortuitous circumstance that one had unknown offsetting deductions
while the other did not. The defense also undermines the deterrent
effect by creating the impression that the law is riddled with technical defenses that can relieve a guilty person of his just deserts.
Nevertheless, the modern learning on the impossibility defense
in the law of attempt teaches that there are significant dangers to
allowing persons to be convicted solely on the basis of their beliefs
and intent without regard to their acts. These dangers include
vastly enhanced prosecutorial discretion and the resulting increased risk of discriminatory prosecutions against unpopular individuals and groups, and the danger of excessive reliance on suspect
evidence: a person's associates, his past criminal record, accomplice
evidence, his reputation in the community, etc. The history of the
income tax law teaches that the danger of discriminatory prosecution against unpopular persons and groups and political enemies is
a real and not a fancied concern.
To balance these competing concerns, this Article proposes to
revise the No-Tax-Due defense to permit conviction where the defendant either willfully claimed, or attempted to claim, an improper deduction or credit, or willfully omitted, or attempted to
omit, income that was properly reportable. By requiring that the
defendant commit some objectively guilty act, that is, that he
claimed, or attempted to claim, an improper deduction or credit, or
that he omitted, or attempted to omit, income that was properly
reportable, the dangers that would result from permitting a defendant to be convicted solely on the basis of intent can be
avoided. At the same time, curtailing the No-Tax-Due defense in
the manner proposed would permit convictions in most, probably
all, of the cases where it is currently employed, and thus eliminate
the capricious operation of the defense, which is subversive of our
sense of justice.
Ideally, the current No-Tax-Due defense should be reformed legislatively. Nevertheless, the courts should not hesitate to correct
prospectively the errors of the current No-Tax-Due doctrine that
they engrafted onto the law.
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